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I. Antitrust Law
A. Retroactive Application of New Decisions-Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), rev'd,
396 U.S. 13 (1969).
The Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Simpson v. Union Oil Co.'
presents the second noteworthy development in the law occasioned by
this unusual antitrust case-a case in which the same two parties have
litigated over the same cause of action for more than a decade.
Some acquaintance with the first development is a prerequisite of
understanding the second. In 1964, the Simpson case afforded an
opportunity for the United States Supreme Court to undertake a signifi-
cant reshaping of the case law governing resale price maintenance.
The contours of that reshaping can be discerned only against a back-
ground composed of several older decisions.
Over half a century ago, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D.
Park & Sons, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court laid down the basic rule that
resale price maintenance-the "vertical" price-fixing technique whereby
a manufacturer sells his products to retailers under enforced contracts
prescribing the prices at which the retailers may resell them-is a re-
straint of trade prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.3  Dr. Miles did not win approval in every quarter. Whether or
not the economic advantages of resale price maintenance outweigh its
economic disadvantages, and whether or not it ultimately tends to foster
or to suppress competition, have always been vigorously disputed ques-
tions in academic and business circles. 4 It was therefore quite predict-
able that the absolute prohibition embodied in the Dr Miles decision
would be substantially emasculated in the ensuing years by several
broad exceptions.5
1. 411 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), rev'd, 396 U.S. 13 (1969).
2. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
4. For a comprehensive analysis of the arguments for and against resale price
maintenance see Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance,
22 U. CHi. L. REv. 825 (1955).
5. The most far-reaching and important of these exceptions is the network of
state fair-trade laws. In 1937, Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, tit.
VIII, 50 Stat. 693 (codified in two provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964)). This Act
provides in substance that wherever a state statute expressly authorizes the practice,
manufacturers of trademarked or branded commodities may contract with their retailers
for the establishment of minimum prices at which those commodities are to be re-
sold, anything in the federal antitrust laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
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The Supreme Court itself sanctioned one large exception in United
States v. General Electric Co.," a noted 1926 case involving some subtle
interplay between antitrust policy and patent policy. General Electric,
the defendant patentee, had contrived a marketing system in which it
consigned its patented incandescent lamps to numerous other com-
panies designated as its agents. These agents in turn sold the lamps to
consumers at prices determined solely by General Electric. Assailing
the entire scheme as a transparent subterfuge designed to circumvent
the ban on resale price maintenance, the government sued for an in-
junction against the defendant's marketing practices. The case was
decided in favor of General Electric. The arrangements in question,
the Court held, did not, strictly speaking, constitute resale price main-
tenance.
The Court emphasized the clear distinction in law between the
independent retailer, who purchases goods from a supplier and then
resells them to consumers on his own behalf, and the consignee retailer,
who takes possession of the supplier's goods and then sells them on the
supplier's behalf.7 From a technical, legal standpoint, there can ob-
viously be no resale price maintenance in the latter instance, for the
sales made by a consignee are first sales, not "re-sales." Hence, when a
supplier who dictates prices to his consignee retailer is charged with
practicing resale price maintenance, courts will sustain the charge only
if it is demonstrated that the consignment agreement is a mere legalistic
disguise for what really amounts to a sale by supplier to retailer. Con-
cluding on the basis of evidence in the record that the relationships be-
tween General Electric and its distributors and retailers were indeed
genuine agency relationships between a consignor and its consignees,
as distinguished from vendor-purchaser relationships artfully camou-
flaged by paper contracts of agency, the Supreme Court rejected the
government's charge of resale price maintenance.8
As an alternative argument, government counsel had also urged
that, irrespective of whether the defendant's consignment arrangements
were genuine or not, the Court should nevertheless condemn the con-
signment price-fixing in this particular case, inasmuch as "the system
of distribution is so complicated and involves such a very large num-
ber of agents, distributed throughout the entire country, that the very
State legislatures were by no means unresponsive to such strong encouragement.
The great majority have enacted "fair-trade" laws, the minimum effect of which is to
permit the maintenance of minimum resale prices on trademarked or branded goods.
A recent tabulation reveals that as of 1967, fair-trade laws were in force in 42
states. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 6017, at 9032 (1967). For a specimen statute,
see California's Fair Trade Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16900-05.
6. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
7. Id. at 481-85.
8. Id. at 485.
[Vol. 21
size and comprehensiveness of the scheme brings it within the Anti-
Trust law."9  The Court rejected this argument also, noting that the
consigned products were patented, and that "the comprehensiveness of a
patentee's control of the business in the sale of a patented article is not
necessarily an indication of illegality of his method."'1 Fortified by the
General Electric decision, patentees prepared to inaugurate marketing
operations modeled after General Electric's anticipated no difficulties
with the Dr. Miles rule.
Among many perplexities engendered by General Electric was the
question whether the Court's reasoning served to validate price-fixing by
large-scale consignment marketing of nonpatented goods as well. There
was widespread and persistent belief that it did." However, since Gen-
eral Electric involved patented products only, all language in the opinion
to that effect should no doubt be set down as dictum.' 2  Notwithstand-
ing the Supreme Court's powerful encouragement, vast systems of verti-
cal price-fixing by consignment remained relatively uncommon for many
years after 1926; not only are such programs economically impracticable
for all but the most powerful and well-financed manufacturers,'" but
for many years the fair trade laws in force in most states permitted re-
sale price maintenance and thus rendered recourse to the General Elec-
tric loophole unnecessary.' 4 In consequence, the legality of resale
price maintenance by consignment of nonpatented goods was seldom
litigated, and the courts had almost no opportunity to decide the ques-
tion directly.' 5
The General Electric exception to the Dr. Miles rule-or perhaps
more accurately, any assumed extension of that exception to large-scale
consignment marketing of nonpatented products-received its quietus
four years ago in Simpson v. Union Oil Co. 6 The Court adjudged that
the "consignment agreements" under which large oil companies dic-
tated to their service station managers the retail prices to be charged
for gasoline were in reality contracts for vertical price-fixing in viola-
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 478-88.
12. Sun Oil Co. v. FTC, 350 F.2d 624, 633 (7th Cir. 1965).
13. See generally Klaus, Sale, Agency and-Price Maintenance, 28 COLUM. L. REv.
312 (1928).
14. See note 5 supra.
15. In a 1949 case, the government once again attacked General Electric's
practice of marketing and maintaining the prices. on- its incandescent lamps by con-
signment. By this time the patents on the lamps had expired. The" cort upheld the
legality of the arrangement even though patented products 'were no longer involved.
It should be noted, however, that the court rested this conclusion in pirt upon .the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, and that the. legality-of consignment price-fixing was
only one minor issue in a very complex case, which the government won on other
grounds. United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 827 (D.NJ. 1949).
16. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
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tion of the Sherman Act. The legality of such agreements, the Court
declared, could no longer be vindicated-as it was in the General Elec-
tric case-by conventional legal theorizing to the effect that they are
merely an employer's instructions to his sales agent, as distinguished
from contracts between a manufacturer and retailer both of whom are
independent entrepreneurs."7 Universally acknowledged to be a mi-
nor landmark, the Supreme Court's Simpson decision has naturally be-
come the subject of extensive comment in the reviews.'"
The Supreme Court opinion announcing the new "Simpson rule"
concluded with some rather unusual and-as is borne out by sub-
sequent developments-rather troublesome language. The opinion of
the Court, after directing a remand to the district court for trial, de-
clared that "we reserve the question whether, when all the facts are
known, there may be any equities that would warrant only prospective
application in damage suits of the rule governing price fixing by the
'consignment' device which we announce today."'"
Thus the Court raised-but did not answer-a vexing question:
Should the Simpson rule be limited to purely prospective application,
or should it operate retroactively, thereby imposing treble-damage lia-
bility on Union Oil and other antitrust defendants for business activities
undertaken in alleged reliance upon the superseded General Electric rule?
Absent an unambiguous pronouncement from the high Court, the lower
federal courts were obliged to cull their own answers from the stand-
ard authorities. However, such guidance as precedent affords in this
matter is analogical and generally meager. For not only is the legal
theory of retroactivity "still in a developing stage, ' 20 but "in antitrust
cases, the question of retroactivity is still open.' Compelled by the
course of events to explore this terra incognita, the Ninth Circuit
in an opinion written by Judge James M. Carter, affirmed an order of
the district court on remand, dismissing Simpson's action on the ground
that the equities of the case did not warrant applying the Supreme
Court's Simpson rule retroactively against Union Ol.22 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed per curiam.23
It is the purpose of this Note to discuss and evaluate the Ninth
17. Id. at 21-22.
18. E.g., The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 282 (1964);
17 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1965); 18 VAND. L. REV. 222 (1964); 10 VILL. L. REV. 366
(1965).
19. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 25 (1964).
20. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 260 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21. Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 377 F.2d 776, 789 (3d Cir.
1967).
22. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1969), aff'g 270 F. Supp.
754 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
23. See note 129 infra.
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Circuit's treatment of the retroactivity issue in its most recent Simpson
opinion. In order to furnish background and perspective for the dis-
cussion, it is necessary to recount briefly the operative facts and pro-
cedural history of the case.
Background
From 1956 to 1958, Richard S. Simpson, plaintiff-appellant,
operated a service station in Fresno, California, which he subleased for
renewable one-year terms from the Union Oil Company, the defendant-
appellee. Like many other2" station managers, Simpson obtained gaso-
line from Union by virtue of a standardized "Retail Dealer Consignment
Agreement." The terms of this agreement were drafted in such fashion
as to constitute Simpson an agent or consignee of Union rather than
an independent retail dealer. Whenever Union delivered or "con-
signed" gas to Simpson, the latter merely took possession thereof.
"Legal title" to the gas technically remained vested in Union until it
was sold to motorists.
The consignment agreement also fixed or "authorized" a definite
and invariable retail price for the gasoline-in this case, 29.9 cents per
gallon. Early in 1958, in an effort to meet a local competitor's reduced
price, Simpson began selling gas for 27.9 cents per gallon. Union de-
manded that he maintain the authorized price in accordance with their
agreement. Simpson refused to comply. Union thereupon retaliated
by terminating the consignment agreement and declining to renew Simp-
son's lease. After a federal district court denied Simpson's petition for
an injunction restraining nonrenewal of the lease, 25 Union finally evicted
its uncooperative station manager by bringing an unlawful detainer
action in a state court.
26
Some months thereafter, Simpson counter-attacked by filing a civil
action against Union under section 4 of the Clayton Act.27  The com-
plaint alleged, inter alia, that the "Retail Dealer Consignment Agree-
ment," insofar as it established retail prices, was a contract in restraint
of trade, and that the antitrust laws gave him a right of action to recover
damages caused by Union's coercive enforcement of the unlawful agree-
ment.
The district court granted Union's pretrial motion for summary
24. As of December 31, 1967, Union had consignment agreements with more
than 3000 of its service station managers. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 15
(1964).
25. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 162 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
26. This general statement of the facts is taken from Simpson v. Union Oil Co.,
311 F.2d 764, 765-66 (9th Cir. 1963).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
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judgment.28 Simpson appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.29
Disposition of the appeal was accomplished without reference to any
substantive issues raised in the complaint. The court expressed no
opinion on the legality of Union's price-fixing by consignment,30 but
rather affirmed on the ground that Simpson suffered no actionable dam-
age as a consequence of Union's refusal to renew the lease.3 ' Simpson
petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. 2
In a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
affirmance. 3  Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, determined
that the consignment agreement in question violated the Sherman Act
as an agreement for resale price maintenance. Moreover, the Supreme
Court disagreed with the court of appeals that there was no actionable
damage if a Sherman Act violation were assumed.3 4 Although there is
nothing intrinsically illegal about consignment agreements, the Court
explained, and although they may indeed be "useful in allocating risks
between the parties and determining their rights inter se,"3 neverthe-
less "when the consignment device is used to cover a vast gasoline
distribution system, fixing prices through many retail outlets, the anti-
trust laws prevent calling the consignment an agency, for then . . .
[the antitrust laws] would be avoided merely by clever manipulation
of words, not by differences in substance.1
36
There has been considerable uncertainty concerning the impact
of Simpson on the old General Electric decision. Did the Supreme
Court overrule General Electric, either expressly or by implication?
Or was that decision merely distinguished, narrowed, or limited in
Simpson? The consensus of opinion seems to be that General Electric
was distinguished or limited, but not overruled outright. 7 Such a
conclusion appears warranted by certain language in the Simpson deci-
sion: "[W]hatever may be said of the General Electric case on its
special facts, involving patents, it is not apposite to the special facts
here."3 8  On the other hand, the express language of the Simpson
28. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 1961 TRADE. CAS. 69,936, at 77,693 (N.D. Cal.
1960).
29. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 311 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1963).
30. Id. at 769.
31. Id.
32. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 373 U.S. 901 (1963).
33. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (Harlan, J., did not partici-
pate).
34. Id. at 16.
35. Id. at 17.
36. Id. at 21-22.
37. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REV. 143, 280-82
(1964). But see Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 29 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
38. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 23 (1964).
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opinion would seem to foreclose any doubts that the Court was con-
sciously announcing a new rule of law. The Court concluded its opin-
ion by remanding the cause to the district court for trial "on all other
issues," including the question .whether or not the equities of the case
"would warrant only prospective application in damage suits of the
rule governing price-fixing by the 'consignment' device which we an-
nounce today."39
On remand to the district court, the case was finally tried to a
jury. The jury returned a verdict for Simpson in the amount of
$160,000. However, the court reserved to itself the decision of the
"equities" issue and decided that issue in favor of Union. The new
rule enunciated by the Supreme Court, so the district court reasoned,
should not be applied retroactively. If it were, Union would be subject
to treble-damage liability for executing and enforcing contracts which,
at the time of execution, it had every reason to regard as lawful and
unassailable under the antitrust laws as expounded in the General Elec-
tric case. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Simpson's action
with prejudice on the "equities" or retroactivity issue.
40
Obviously somewhat unsure of itself and apprehensive about re-
versal on the delicate and complex issue of retroactivity, the court went
one step further. It entered an order setting aside the jury's verdict-
which it regarded as preposterously out of proportion to any actual
damages sustained-and granted Union's motion for a new trial, should
that prove necessary. 41 From both the order of dismissal and the order
granting a new trial, Simpson appealed.
The Ninth Circuit Disposition of Simpson's Appeal
Discussion of the Ninth Circuit's affirmance of the lower court's
order granting Union a new trial involves various "measure of recovery"
issues, all of which are outside the scope of this Note. Suffice it to men-
tion that the court did affirm the order, agreeing with the district court
that the $160,000 verdict far exceeded any actual financial loss sus-
tained by Simpson, who immediately after his removal from the Union
station began operating a Mobil station at approximately the same rate
of profit.42
The truly formidable difficulties placed before the Ninth Circuit
by Simpson's appeal arose not from the issue of damages, but from the
issue of retroactivity. Was the district court correct in concluding that
Union's reliance on the General Electric decision necessitated purely
39. Id. at 24-25.
40. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 270 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
41. Id.
42. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 907-10 (9th Cir. 1969).
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prospective application of the Simpson rule, and that therefore even
Simpson himself should be denied recovery under the rule first an-
nounced in the course of his own lawsuit? The Ninth Circuit's resolu-
tion of this issue was divided into two parts. First, the court consid-
ered whether any provisions of the United States Constitution had deci-
sive bearing on the choice between prospectivity and retroactivity. Sec-
ond, various general considerations of fairness and justice were weighed
with a view to determining whether or not the "balance of equities"
tilted the scales-as the district court had thought-in favor of pro-
spective limitation of the new rule.
Simpson's counsel interposed two "constitutional objections" to
the lower court's decree of prospective limitation. First, it was con-
tended that the resulting denial of recovery deprived Simpson of his
property without due process, in violation of the fifth amendment. The
second objection was that since the Constitution vests only "judicial
power" in the federal courts, they are precluded from announcing new
rules of law without at least applying them to the litigants in the partic-
ular case; otherwise the court's action would amount to an unconstitu-
tional judicial exercise of "legislative power." The court made short
work of these constitutional arguments for two reasons-one proce-
dural, the other substantive.4" In the first place, Simpson apparently
had not propounded any such arguments in the court below.44 Under
a standard rule of appellate procedure, long established in the Ninth
Circuit and most other appellate courts, questions not raised or argued
in the court of first instance need not be entertained on appeal.45 In
the second place, the court indicated that even if these constitutional
questions were properly before it, it could scarcely approve Simpson's
position in the light of such controlling precedents as Linkletter v.
Walker,4 6 in which the Supreme Court reiterated its settled doctrine that
"the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect. '4 7
Having considered and rejected as insubstantial Simpson's consti-
tutional arguments, the court next proceeded to determine whether gen-
eral considerations of fairness and justice-the "balance of equities"-
supported the lower court's limitation of the Simpson rule to purely
prospective application. Here the court ventured upon more treach-
erous ground, since this aspect of the retroactivity problem, unlike the
constitutional aspect, could not be solved by routine citation of a single
governing precedent.
Two prior decisions were, however, selected as analytical guidelines.
43. Id. at 901.
44. Id.
45. Williamson v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 221 F.2d 5, 15 (9th Cir. 1955).
46. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
47. Id. at 629.
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The first was Linkletter v. Walker,48 a criminal case in which the Su-
preme Court held that the decision whether or not to apply a new rule
retroactively depends upon "the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or
retard its operation." 49 The second was Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.,50 in which the Third Circuit indicated that a
defense to retroactive application of new rules of antitrust law might
be established whenever
(1) there was a clearly declared judicial doctrine, (2) upon which
the defendant relied and (3) under which his conduct was lawful;
(4) a doctrine which was overruled (5) in favor of a new rule
according to which conduct performed in reliance upon the old
rule would have been unlawful. 51
Under the Linkletter test, the court seemed to believe, Simpson
might very well have made out a plausible case for retroactivity. That
test attaches great and perhaps decisive importance to the question
whether the purpose of a particular new rule may be furthered by
retroactive application. In this connection, the Ninth Circuit correctly
observed that almost all the new decisional rules limited to purely pro-
spective application have been rules of criminal procedure whose pri-
mary purpose-to deter future police misconduct-would not be ap-
preciably promoted by retroactive application to past transactions.5"
New rules of antitrust law are different in this respect. One very im-
portant purpose of any rule of antitrust law is to provide compensation
for individuals injured by the particular practice which the rule con-
demns. A compensatory purpose of this sort is obviously furthered
rather than retarded by retroactive application of the new rule in ques-
tion.
Moreover, the court noted that there is an additional compelling
reason for applying a new rule of antitrust law retroactively in favor
of the particular plaintiff who succeeded in persuading a court to
adopt the rule.53 To deny that plaintiff his recovery by applying the
rule prospectively might well discourage other plaintiffs from bringing
actions. Especially is this true in the case of individual or "one-time"
plaintiffs who, unlike "institutional plaintiffs," can expect to benefit
48. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
49. Id. at 629.
50. 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
51. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1969). The Ninth
Circuit quoted appellants formulation of the Hanover test which was a verbatim ex-
tract from Hanover Shoe Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 496
(1968). The Supreme Court in Hanover expressly refrained from passing on the
validity of the test. Id. at 496.
52. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 902-03 (9th Cir. 1969).
53. Id. at 903-05.
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solely by their recovery in the particular case. Judicial discouragement
of private antitrust actions is manifestly out of keeping with the legisla-
tive policy underlying section 4 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes
such actions as a means of encouraging private parties to assist in en-
forcement of the antitrust laws. 54
However, once the court mentioned these various factors favoring
retroactivity, it rather abruptly dismissed them from consideration on
the ground that since Simpson had not brought them to the attention of
the district court, the Ninth Circuit panel was not bound to entertain
them on appeal. 5
Since the court foreclosed serious consideration of Simpson's equi-
ties because of this procedural technicality, its affirmance of the lower
court's order of dismissal was virtually a foregone conclusion. Apply-
ing the five-point Hanover test, the Court determined that prior to the
Supreme Court's Simpson decision, the General Electric rule had indeed
been "clearly declared judicial doctrine"; that Union Oil justifiably re-
lied on the doctrine in framing and enforcing its consignment agree-
ments; that under the General Electric rule these agreements did not
violate the antitrust laws; and that the Simpson case, whether or not it
"overruled" General Electric, at least represented a palpable departure
from the General Electric doctrine. 56 The court was persuaded that
Union Oil's conduct satisfied the five Hanover requirements. It was
apparently also persuaded that once the Hanover requirements were
satisfied, then absent any entertainable equities in favor of Simpson,
Union had established its case for nonretroactivity of the Simpson rule.
The district court's order of dismissal was affirmed.
The judges expressed a guarded conclusion: "The problem is
fraught with difficulties, and we only hold that the trial court proceeded
in a proper manner to consider the 'equities' which should save Union
from liability to appellant." 7
One writer's comment on the Supreme Court's 1964 Simpson deci-
sion was that "the problems involved are complex, and probably not
entirely capable of solution by traditional methods of legal research."5 8
This statement applies equally to the latest Simpson decision rendered
by the Ninth Circuit. The issue of retroactivity is complex in whatever
particular context it arises. In antitrust cases, the dearth of guiding
precedent magnifies the inherent difficulties. Moreover, analysis of the
Simpson case must take account of an additional complicating factor:
54. Id.
55. Id. at 905.
56. Id. at 905-07.
57. Id. at 905.
58. RahI, Control of an Agent's Prices: The Simpson Case-A Study in Anti-
trust Analysis, 61 Nw. U.L. R1v. 1, 6 (1966).
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According to the general consensus, the Supreme Court's Simpson deci-
sion was not an "overruling decision."' 5 9 Most legal writers who have
discussed the general subject of retroactivity have concentrated primar-
ily on "the retroactivity of overruling decisions." 60  Are there different
considerations involved in the case of a new rule of law produced by a
decision that did not overrule a prior decision? Some say yes, 61 others
say no.62 The remainder of this Note is devoted to an evaluation of the
Ninth Circuit's decision in the light of existing law on retroactivity of
judicial decisions. Though the term "overruling decision" will be occa-
sionally used for convenience sake and by way of close analogy, it must
always be remembered that the Supreme Court's Simpson decision was
something slightly-perhaps significantly-different.
At the outset, it is desirable to formulate working definitions of
"prospectivity" and "retroactivity." Neither term has been used in a
univocal sense throughout the pertinent literature. 3  Generally speak-
ing, a court charged with the duty of applying a new rule of decisional
law has three alternative lines of action available. 64 First, it may decree
that the new rule will be accorded prospective operation only-i.e.,
it will be applied solely to cases in which the plaintiff's cause of action
arose after the promulgation of the new rule. In technical parlance,
this alternative alone is the one denominated "prospective overrul-
ing" or "pure prospectivity. '65  Second, the court may decree that
the new rule will be applied retroactively in certain specified cases
-in the case in which the rule was enunciated, for example-but pro-
spectively in all others. This alternative may be referred to as "limited
retroactivity." Third, the court may decree that the new rule will
apply retroactively to all cases, irrespective of who the parties are or
when the action arose. This is "unlimited retroactivity."
It is important to bear clearly in mind the distinctions between
these three alternatives. It is also important to understand that in
Simpson, the Ninth Circuit was not directly concerned with the third
alternative. The panel's exclusive concern was to decide between the
first alternative as advocated by Union and the second as advocated by
59. See note 37 supra.
60. In this connection, note the titles of articles cited at notes 61 & 65 infra.
61. See Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitu-
tional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 HAv. L. REv. 437, 441 (1947).
62. See Mishkin, The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Law, 79 HAv. L. REv. 56, 65 n.34 (1965).
63. See, e.g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Douglas, 3.,
dissenting): "At least the Court should not say as respects Katz that it is given 'wholly
prospective application,' when it was made retroactive in his case."
64. Cf. Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371, 1378-79 (1966).
65. Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal
Courts, 71 YALE L.L 907, 911 (1962).
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Simpson. Deciding between the first and the second alternatives is
substantially different from-and quite probably more difficult than-
deciding between the first and the third. As will be demonstrated
presently, decisions in this area are always the end-product of a court's
delicate evaluation and balancing of a number of elusive and highly
variable determinants. The balance of variables that ultimately condi-
tions a decision between pure prospectivity and limited retroactivity is
different from the balance of variables that ultimately conditions a deci-
sion between pure prospectivity and unlimited retroactivity. These im-
portant differences were implicitly acknowledged in another antitrust
case several years ago, wherein the district court, rejecting the plaintiff's
contention that the Supreme Court's Simpson rule should apply retro-
actively, observed that "even if the Supreme Court ultimately applies
the new doctrine retroactively to the Union Oil Co. in the particular
case before it, it does not follow that the rule should be given a general
retroactive effect in other cases." '66
Prospective or Retroactive: The Relevant Factors
Once the various forms of retroactivity are defined and clearly
distinguished, the next step is to determine what principles and consid-
erations should guide the courts when they undertake to decide whether,
and to what extent, a new rule of decisional law should operate retro-
actively.
It is settled beyond much doubt that no provisions of the Constitu-
tion are determinative of the retroactivity issue. "[T]he Federal Con-
stitution," in Justice Cardozo's sententious phrase, "has no voice upon
the subject. '6 7  To be sure, the "subject" specifically referred to by
Cardozo was the challenged power of a state court to decree that an
overruling decision shall be purely prospective in its operation. 68 But
the proposition is no less valid for federal courts than for state courts,
nor for all degrees of retroactivity than for prospectivity. In Linkletter
v. Walker,69 it was stated simply that "the Constitution neither prohibits
nor requires retrospective effect.
'70
More particularly, the Supreme Court has on different occasions
ruled: (1) that the retroactive application of overruling decisions in
actions ex contractu cannot be assailed as an unconstitutional impair-
ment of contractual obligations, inasmuch as the constitutional pro-
scription of all such impairments "is directed only against impairment
66. Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 235 F. Supp. 526, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
67. Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932).
68. Id.
69. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
70. Id. at 629.
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by legislation, and not by judgments of courts"; 71 (2) that overruling
decisions retroactively applied do not come under the constitutional
prohibition of ex post facto laws, inasmuch as that interdiction also
extends to "legislative action only, and does not reach. . decisions by
the courts"; 72 and finally, (3) that neither purely prospective applica-
tion nor any degree of retroactive application in itself contravenes either
the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.73
In view of the fact that the great constitutional concepts-espe-
cially those relating to "due process of law" and "equal protection of the
laws"--are by no means frozen or timebound, it is not inconceivable
that certain aspects of the retroactivity question may at some future day
be deemed controlled by principles of constitutional law.74  Pending
the advent of that future day, however, there remains the longstanding
and overwhelming array of authorities, all of which compel the conclu-
sion that the Ninth Circuit was abundantly justified in rejecting appel-
lant Simpson's "constitutional objections" to nonretroactivity, just as
the court would have been equally justified in rejecting constitutional
objections to retroactivity, had any been interposed by Union.
Assuming that constitutional doctrine in its present state of devel-
opment does not dictate the choice between prospectivity and retroac-
tivity in any particular case, the question remains to be answered: How
do courts determine what measure of retroactivity, if any, is to be given
to a new decisional rule? An examination of the cases in point dis-
closes five principal criteria, all of them flexible and pragmatic, that
courts facing the problem have commonly adopted as guidelines.
Taken together, these five criteria furnish a rough analytical framework
within which the courts have, consciously or subconsciously, balanced
"equities" of the sort adverted to by the Supreme Court at the conclu-
sion of its Simpson opinion. In the overwhelming majority of cases, no
71. Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 451 (1924); accord, Washington v.
Maricopa Co., 152 F.2d 556, 560 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 799 (1946).
72. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915).
73. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
74. There are occasional intimations, for example, that limited retroactivity,
which accords the benefit of a new rule to certain selected parties while denying it to
others, may in some instances fail to meet the requirements of due process and equal
protection. Consider the following:
"The most notorious example is Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, where, as I
recall, some 80 cases were presented raising the same question. We took four of them
and held the rest and then disposed of each of the four, applying the new procedural rule
retroactively. But as respects the rest of the pending cases we denied any relief.
"It still remains a mystery how some convicted people are given new trials for
unconstitutional convictions and others are kept in jail without any hope of relief
though their complaint is equally meritorious." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
255-56 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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one criterion alone proves decisive. The final resolution of the retro-
activity issue turns upon a combined consideration and skillful balanc-
ing of the competing claims of all five criteria as applied to the unique
factual situation at bar. Furthermore, it is not pretended that a list
of five criteria constitutes an exhaustive enumeration. There are doubt-
less additional considerations influencing the judicial mind in many
cases. It is contended only that the following five criteria are those
most frequently and most decisively taken into account by courts seek-
ing to resolve the retroactivity problem.
Criterion 1: The extent to which retroactive operation, limited or
unlimited, may serve to further the purposes that underlie the new rule.
Judicial utilization of this first criterion is perhaps best exemplified in
recent Supreme Court decisions concerning criminal procedure.
Linkletter v. Walker,75 one of the most notable of these decisions,
sets forth a detailed (and for the time being, apparently definitive) anal-
ysis of the retroactivity question. In Linkletter, the Court addressed
itself to the task of determining whether and to what extent one of its
own overruling decisions, Mapp v. Ohio,76 should operate retroactively.
The majority in Mapp had overruled Wolf v. Colorado77 by holding that
the exclusionary rule first enunciated in Weeks v. U.S.78 precluded the
admission of unlawfully seized evidence in state criminal trials.
The Mapp decision was handed down on June 19, 1961. In
Linkletter it was decided that the new Mapp rule should be given only
limited retroactivity: that is, only those defendants whose judgments of
conviction had not become final before June 19, 1961 could claim the
benefit of the Mapp rule. 9
The Linkletter Court found justification for this limited retroac-
tivity in the very purpose the Mapp rule was intended to serve. The
fundamental purpose of enforcing an exclusionary rule in state crim-
inal prosecutions, so the majority reasoned, is to provide an effective
deterrent to unlawful searches and seizures by state law enforcement
officers. 80  "We cannot say," the Court continued, "that this purpose
would be advanced by making the rule [unlimitedly] retrospective
. . . the ruptured privacy of the victims' homes cannot be restored.
Reparation comes too late.""1  To be sure, the fact that unlimited
75. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
76. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
77. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
78. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
79. "By final we mean where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the
availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed
before our decision in Mapp v. Ohio." 381 U.S. at 622 n.5.
80. Id. at 636.
81. Id. at 637.
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retroactivity could not appreciably further the purpose underlying an
exclusionary rule was not the only reason for denying unlimited retro-
activity.82 But there is no question that this fact weighed heavily in
the balance.
Linkletter v. Walker thus affords an illuminating example of the
manner in which a court applies the "purpose" criterion in order to
determine the extent of a new rule's retroactivity. However, one caveat
should be kept in mind. The exclusionary rule is somewhat unusual in
that its prime purpose is deterrence. Most other rules of law, including
rules of antitrust law, are designed to effectuate at least two important
purposes: deterrence of wrongdoers and compensation of the victims
for the wrongdoing. In the ordinary case, therefore, application of the
"purpose" criterion is more difficult than in the case of the exclusionary
rule. A court must first identify the overriding or paramount purpose,
and then consider whether that purpose could be promoted by retroac-
tive operation of the rule.
83
Criterion 2: The extent to which retroactive operation may "open
the floodgates of litigation," thereby overburdening the courts and ob-
structing the administration of justice. This criterion is of prime im-
portance in criminal cases, where the courts frequently express fearful
apprehensions that unlimited retroactivity of an overruling decision
would inspire thousands of habeas corpus petitions and perhaps neces-
sitate the release of innumerable guilty prisoners.8 4  This criterion
would seem applicable also in at least some civil cases. For example,
there were more than 3000 gas station operators with whom Union Oil
had concluded "Retail Dealer Consignment Agreements." The possi-
bility that any substantial portion of these potential plaintiffs might
bring suit against Union would surely militate against unlimited retro-
activity of the Simpson rule.
Criterion 3: The extent to which retroactive operation may prove
82. The Court also noted that "[there are interests in the administration of
justice and the integrity of the judicial process to consider. To make the rule of Mapp
retrospective would tax the administration of justice to the utmost. .. ." Id.
83. See Comment, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the
Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 943-44 (1962).
84. See, e.g., Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966). The Court held that the
new rule laid down in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), would not be given
unlimited retroactivity. The Griffin rule is that adverse comment by a prosecutor
or trial judge upon a defendant's failure to testify in a state criminal trial violates the
defendant's federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority in Tehan, observed that "to require all those states [i.e., states
which prior to Griffin permitted adverse commentary by judge or prosecutor on a
defendant's failure to testify] now to void the conviction of every person who did not
testify at his trial would have an impact upon the administration of their criminal law
so devastating as to need no elaboration." 382 U.S. at 419 (emphasis added).
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necessary in order to compensate a successful plaintiff for his exertions,
and thereby to provide an incentive for other plaintiffs to challenge
obsolescent precedents. Because the "incentive factor" comes into play
only when a court decides between pure prospectivity and limited retro-
activity, it is particularly germane to a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's
latest Simpson decision.
Some commentators have sought to minimize the importance of
this factor by pointing out that the rather remote possibility that a court
will overrule a precedent and announce a new rule of law is seldom
sufficient to induce reasonable men to institute lawsuits.8 5 On the other
hand, it is a truism that departures from the doctrine of stare decisis
are far from infrequent in our enlightened times. Numerous "test
cases" are commenced for the express purpose of provoking such de-
partures. Often the plaintiffs not only win their cases, but win conse-
quent acclaim as public benefactors.
Notwithstanding all that may be said for or against its underlying
rationale, the decided cases should dissolve any doubts that this third
criterion has in fact been considered by courts confronting the retroac-
tivity question. Many courts that have in recent years stricken down
the age-old tort immunity of charitable or governmental corporations
have applied the new rule of liability in the overruling case itself, and
have explicitly justified such "limited retroactivity" by pointing to the
necessity of rewarding the pathbreaking plaintiff."6
Finally, it is in connection with this criterion that courts have
drawn the important distinction between "one-time litigants" and "in-
stitutional litigants," a distinction adverted to by the Ninth Circuit in
Simpson.a7 Owing to the multiplicity of their potentially friction-pro-
ducing contacts with the general public, such "institutional litigants" as
public utilities, insurance companies and other large business concerns
are frequently involved in litigation. Therefore, the institutional plain-
tiff who succeeds in persuading a court to overrule a precedent stands
to benefit not only from its recovery in the overruling case itself, but
also from future judicial application of the new rule. Retroactivity
need not be decreed in order to reward the institutional plaintiff in such
cases. The situation differs markedly, however, with respect to the
"one-time litigant" or private individual. His only substantial recom-
85. E.g., von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HAv. L.
Rav. 409, 426 (1924).
86. E.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959). "[To refuse to apply the new rule here would deprive appellant of any
benefit from his effort and expense in challenging the old rule which we now delcare
erroneous. Thus there would be no incentive to appeal the upholding of precedent
since appellant could not in any event benefit from a reversal invalidating it." id. at
28, 163 N.E.2d at 97.
87. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 903 (9th Cir. 1969).
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pense for persuading a court to overrule a precedent and establish a
new rule is recovery of damages in his own case. The third criterion,
therefore, should incline a court to give at least limited retroactivity to
an overruling decision in which the plaintiff happens to be a private
party.
Criterion 4: The extent of the detriment incurred by a losing liti-
gant in reliance upon the former rule. This criterion is seldom explic-
itly mentioned in the cases. Courts usually treat "reliance" as a single
undifferentiated concept without distinguishing between its "reason-
ableness" and its "detrimental character." However, a separate consid-
eration of each of these two aspects of reliance will facilitate and
sharpen analysis. There are two categories of "overruling decisions"
which have almost always been restricted to purely prospective opera-
tion: the municipal bond cases and the "substantive" criminal cases.
It is submitted that the extreme detriment which losing litigants would
suffer in these cases as a result of reliance on overruled decisions goes
far to explain why overruling decisions in these two areas are seldom,
if ever, retroactively applied.
In one very recent decision, 88 the Supreme Court held that mu-
nicipal bond issues are invalid where the voters in the municipal election
authorizing the bond issue were required to pass a property-qualifica-
tion test that the Court deemed violative of the equal protection clause.
This was an altogether novel holding, and the Court decreed that the
new rule would be purely prospective in its operation. Though the
Court's reasoning was not set forth at any great length, 9 the true ex-
planation of the decreed prospectivity is not difficult to fathom. The
invalidation of a municipal bond issue that has been finalized would
occasion tremendous administrative inconvenience for the municipality,
probably including the cancellation of many large contracts. For these
reasons, pure prospectivity has been decreed in a long line of previous
"overruling" bond cases.9 0
The same is true of the criminal cases where retroactive applica-
tion of an overruling decision would make possible the conviction of a
defendant whose allegedly criminal conduct was lawful under the over-
88. Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
89. "Significant hardships would be imposed on cities, bondholders, and others
connected with municipal utilities if our decision today were given full retroactive
effect.... Thus, the decision will not apply where the authorization to issue the
securities is legally complete on the date of this decision. Of course, our decision
will not affect the validity of securities which have been sold prior to this decision and
pursuant to such final authorization." Id. at 706.
90. E.g., Gelpke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 175 (1864); Payne v. Covington,
276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938); State v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 384 P.2d
833 (1963).
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ruled decisions.91 Even in these cases pure prospectivity has not been
the absolutely unvarying rule.9" However, principle and authority unite
to pronounce it by far the better rule.9 3 And again the reason is because
retroactivity would cause the defendant to suffer the extreme detriment
of criminal penalties as a result of his reliance on former decisions.94
After all, what "detriment" could conceivably be greater than loss of
life, loss of liberty, or the enduring stigma of criminality?
Thus the authorities lend support to the proposition that the choice
between prospectivity and retroactivity of a new rule should depend in
some measure on how much a defendant is likely to lose if the rule is
applied retroactively. In most civil cases, there will quite obviously be
a considerable difference in this respect between limited retroactivity,
which might compel a defendant to pay only one judgment for damages,
and unlimited retroactivity, which might compel him to pay a thousand.
A final interesting question presents itself: Might not the aforementioned
distinction between one-time litigants and institutional litigants in the
context of incentives to plaintiffs prove useful in connection with the
"detriment"-to-defendants criterion? It would seem so at first sight;
a $10,000 judgment, for example, would not be nearly so burdensome
a detriment to a multimillion dollar corporation as it would be to a pri-
vate individual of ordinary means.
Criterion 5: The reasonableness or justifiability of a losing liti-
gant's reliance upon overruled or "narrowed" former decisions. This
criterion comes into play only when the new rule of law in question has
altered or supplanted a former rule.
91. Unguarded language in some of the cases may give rise to a mistaken belief
that conviction under such circumstances contravenes the constitutional prohibition of ex
post facto laws. In State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. Super. 169, 214 A.2d 428 (App. Div.
1965), the court stated: "It is uniformly recognized that it would be fundamentally un-
just to render criminal, by an overruling decision, conduct which was not criminal when
it occurred. This would be equivalent in effect on the accused to an ex post facto
statute." Id. at 185, 214 A.2d at 436-37. The statement is perfectly correct in the
sense that both retroactive operation of overruling criminal decisions and ex post facto
penal statutes are objectionable on the same general philosophical grounds. But it
should not be misinterpreted as implying that an overruling criminal decision, retro-
actively applied, comes within the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws.
Those prohibitions apply only to legislative enactments, not judicial decisions. Frank
v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915).
92. See State v. Striggles, 202 Iowa 1318, 210 N.W. 137 (1926). In this case
the defendant storeowner was convicted of maintaining a gambling device on his
premises despite the fact that he relied on an overturned decision of an inferior court
which had held that the device in question was lawful under the applicable statute.
93. See R. PmKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 815 (1st ed. 1957).
94. One court laid significant stress on the "heavy penalties and the stigma of
criminal convictions" that would necessarily result from retroactivity of overruling de-
cisions concerning substantive criminal law. State v. Jones, 44 N.M. 623, 630, 107
P.2d 324, 329 (1940).
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Reliance upon an existing rule of case law is deemed reasonable
or justifiable if the rule itself fulfills two requirements. First, it must
be clearly defined; second, it must be well-received by both the legal
community and the informed public." The necessity of imposing the
first requirement is largely a matter of common sense. Reliance pre-
supposes the existence of something that may be relied upon; obviously
there can be no reasonable reliance upon an alleged "rule" so vague,
indeterminate and unsettled that reasonable men may disagree widely
upon its exact import or even upon its existence. But the wisdom of
imposing the second requirement is perhaps more debatable. Rules of
law by which important personal and business affairs are regulated
must possess some measure of stability and predictability. An indi-
vidual, so it might be argued, should be able to act in conformance
with a settled precedent today, even a vehemently criticized precedent,
without having to fear that tomorrow a court will overturn the precedent
and apply the overruling decision retroactively, thereby penalizing him
for abiding by the law. On the other hand, courts all too frequently
perpetuate, or at least refrain from abolishing, well-settled precedents
which the majority of legal writers and other informed citizens denounce
as anachronistic and oppressive. Given such a state of affairs, a wide-
spread awareness that reliance on the existing rule is unreasonable and
that consequently the inevitable overruling decision will be applied ret-
roactively may well produce salutary results by discouraging conduct
that, though condemned by popular sentiment, has nevertheless been
condoned by an inert judiciary. 6
Whatever may be the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of
regarding the acceptability of a settled rule as a prerequisite for reason-
able reliance thereon, the fact is that courts have often proceeded upon
this premise. Thus in a 1959 decision,9 7 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey made use of this criterion in deciding that one of its own 1958
decisions, 98 abolishing tort immunity of charitable institutions, would
apply retroactively, and would bar the defendant YMCA from asserting
the immunity in a negligence action commenced in 1958 by a plaintiff
95. See Comment, supra note 65, at 945-47.
96. Cf. Mishkin, The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of
Time and Lav, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56 (1965). "[Elven when 'new law' must be made,
it is often in fact a matter of the court articulating particular clear implications of values
so generally shared in the society that the process might well be characterized as
declaring a preexisting law. Moreover, this must inevitably be so. For it is the basic
role of courts to decide disputes after they have arisen. That function requires
that judicial decisions operate (at least ordinarily) with retroactive effect. In turn,
unless those decisions (at least ordinarily) reflect pre-existing values, such retroactivity
would be intolerable." Id. at 60.
97. Terracciona v. Magee, 53 N.J. Super. 557, 148 A.2d 68 (Super. Ct. 1959).
98. Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 NJ. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958).
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seeking to recover for personal injuries suffered in 1954. Relying on
overruled decisions upholding the immunity, the defendant had not pro-
tected itself with appropriate liability insurance. Reliance was held
not to preclude retroactivity, inasmuch as the overruling decision was
preceded by an immense volume of criticism from judges and legal
writers hostile to the immunity. Such criticism was deemed sufficient
to forewarn the defendant of the immunity's impending demise and
hence to destroy any "reasonable basis for reliance." 99
A similar line of argument was adopted by the Fifth Circuit when
it retroactively applied one of its recent overruling decisions, United
States v. Cocke.100 Cocke was a tax case concerning "carried-interest"
oil and gas transactions. The court held that during the recoupment
period, when all gross profits from oil- and gas-producing property are
payable solely to the owner of the carrying interest, the owner of the
carried interest is not entitled to tax deductions for depletion, deprecia-
tion, and drilling and development costs. Cocke thus overruled a 20
year-old precedent, Commissioner v. J. S. Abercrombie Co.,' 01 in which
the court had held that the owner of a carried interest was entitled to
such deductions during the recoupment period. The taxpayers as-
serted that they acquired their carried interest in reliance upon the over-
ruled Abercrombie decision. Therefore, they argued, the overruling
Cocke decision should not be retroactively applied against them. The
argument proved unpersuasive. Though the court did not deal with
the problem at length, it did note that the Abercrombie rule had long
been denounced by a multitude of legal writers and by the Internal
Revenue Service itself: "[O]ur reappraisal of carried interest taxation
need have no agonizing overtones," said the court, "because it has been
presaged."102 Here again, unreasonable reliance could support no
objections to retroactivity.
Finally, a criminal case recently decided by the Supreme Court
throws some new light on the relationship between reasonable reliance
and retroactivity. In Desist v. United States,03 the Court held that
Katz v. United States"4 would not be given unlimited retroactivity. In
Katz, the Court overruled Olmstead v. United States'0 5 by holding that
"nontrespassory" electronic eavesdropping is a "search" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, and that if unlawfully performed, its
fruits will be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. Adhering closely
99. 53 N.J. Super. at 565, 148 A.2d at 72.
100. 399 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1968).
101. 162 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1947).
102. 399 F.2d at 448.
103. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
104. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
105. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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to the Linkletter rationale, the Court reasoned that because the deter-
rent purpose of the Katz rule would not be served by retroactive appli-
cation, and because under, the Olmstead dispensation law enforcement
officers had used electronic eavesdropping to gather evidence on which
many convictions had been based, Katz should not be allowed unlimited
retroactivity. 10
Four Justices dissented; three wrote separate dissenting opinions.
Justice Fortas took sharp issue with the Court on the justifiability of
law enforcement officers' reliance on Olmstead. He emphasized that in
the 30 year interim between Olmstead and Katz, the Olmstead rule,
with its implausibly narrow construction of the fourth amendment term
"search" as denoting only such physical intrusions as would amount to
a common law trespass, had been subjected to withering criticism in
both scholarly journals and judicial pronouncements-criticism that
clearly marked it a "moribund doctrine.' 07 Katz merely "adminis-
tered the coup de grace."'0 8 During the last decade or so, Fortas ar-
gued, no well-informed person could seriously have doubted that Olm-
stead was destined for deserved oblivion. The only real question was
when the formal overruling decision would come down.
Such being the state of affairs, Justice Fortas thought it incon-
ceivable that law-enforcement personnel or anyone else could "reason-
ably" or "justifiably" rely on Olnstead. When the Court held that
they could, and disallowed unlimited retroactivity of Katz on that
ground, it in effect made petitioner Desist's fourth amendment rights
dependent upon nothing more substantial than the vagaries of calendar
composition. Considering the climate of judicial opinion, there could
be little doubt that had Desist and its companion case come before
the Supreme Court "a day, a year, or a number of years before Katz,
we would have held that the petitioners' constitutional rights had been
violated, and that the petitioners were entitled, like any other citizens,
to their constitutional rights." 09
106. 394 U.S. at 244-54.
107. Id. at 273 (dissenting opinion).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 279. The fact that Justice Fortas' opinion in Desist was a dissent
does not diminish its authoritativeness as much as one might think. For one thing,
Desist was decided by an evenly divided court-four Justices dissented from the opinion
of the Court and one did not participate. Moreover, the Fortas dissent is cited herein
only as exemplifying judicial insistence that reliance on an overruled decision must,
if it is to preclude retroactive application of the overruling decision, be reasonable or
justifiable, and that reasonableness or justifiability is determined in part by the degree
of approval or disapproval generally given to the overruled decision. The Court's
decision that Katz should not be unlimitedly retroactive does not necessarily reflect
disagreement with this basic premise. On the contrary, the Court indicated in
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), that retroactive application may be war-
ranted if the announcement of the new rule has been "clearly foreshadowed." Id. at
These cases all reinforce the same essential point: Only reasonable
or justifiable reliance on an overruled precedent should support a de-
fense to retroactive application of the overruling decision, and in this
connection, one crucial determinant of reasonableness is the extent to
which the overruled precedent was well-received by the legal com-
munity.
Prospectivity and Simpson
Assuming that the foregoing list of five criteria encompasses the
principal factors that a court should take into account when resolving
the issue of retroactivity, one is inclined to conclude that the Ninth Cir-
cuit's limitation of the Simpson rule to pure prospectivity may not have
been supported by a comprehensive consideration of all the relevant
determinants.
As regards the first criterion, it is evident that one of the purposes
of the Simpson rule-to insure compensation for retailers whose busi-
nesses have been damaged or destroyed by coercive enforcement of a
price-fixing consignment arrangement--could be served by retroactive
application. Yet for some unexplained reason, nowhere in its opinion
did the Ninth Circuit make mention of the rule's compensatory function
or of the possibility that it could be promoted, however slightly, by the
limited retroactivity Simpson sought. In a recent antitrust case arising
out of facts almost identical with the facts in Simpson, the federal dis-
trict court in Rhode Island indicated the more correct approach. Dis-
cussing the Simpson rule and its possible applicability to transactions
occurring prior to 1964, that court noted that a rule of nonretroactivity
is unsatisfactory insofar as it "totally ignores the compensatory aspect
of a treble damages award."' 10
The second criterion, the burden on the administration of justice
that retroactivity might impose, was not relevant, and was thus properly
disregarded by the court. Unlimited retroactivity of certain overruling
antitrust decisions might conceivably impose a tremendous burden.
Simpson, however, was seeking only the most limited form of retroac-
tivity-retroactivity limited to himself alone.
731. The Court's refusal to hold Katz unlimitedly retroactive was perhaps dictated by
a belief that in recent times Olmstead had not been as moribund as Fortas thought, and
that consequently reliance thereon was not really so unreasonable; or perhaps the
Court may have consdered that the unreasonableness of law enforcement officers'
reliance on Olmstead-which militated in favor of unlimited retroactivity-was out-
weighed in the balance by the deterrent purpose of the Katz rule, which militated
against it. This latter explanation is probably correct. It was noted in the opinion of
the Court that "[f]oremost among the factors determining retroactivity is the purpose
served by the new constitutional rule. This criterion strongly supports prospectivity
for a decision amplifying the evidentiary exclusionary rule." 394 U.S. at 249.
110. Stanton v. Texaco, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 884, 889 (D.R.I. 1968).
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The court did give some serious consideration to the third criterion
-the necessity of rewarding the plaintiff who persuades a court to
adopt a new rule. In this connection, the court correctly observed that
Simpson is a one-time litigant, and that section 4 of the Clayton Act,
authorizing treble damage suits by private antitrust plaintiffs, rests on a
legislative policy of "enlisting persons injured by antitrust violations as
enforcers by providing an inducement, treble damages plus ex-
penses."11' The transcendent importance of this second point cannot
be emphasized too strongly. Characterizing the private treble-damage
action as a "bulwark of antitrust enforcement," 112 the Supreme Court
has declared that "the purposes of the antitrust laws are best served
by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter
anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the antitrust
laws.""" If there is any likelihood whatever that denying Simpson the
benefit of the new Simpson rule would tend to discourage future anti-
trust plaintiffs from bringing private actions to challenge obsolete rules,
then the Ninth Circuit's prospective limitation of the Simpson rule was
to that extent ill-advised.
Of course, both these considerations-Simpson's status as a one-
time litigant and the legislative policy of encouraging private antitrust
actions-tipped the balance in favor of Simpson and limited retroac-
tivity. As was previously mentioned, the Ninth Circuit dismissed them,
with perceptible misgivings, on the technical procedural ground that
Simpson had not brought them to the attention of the trial court.1 4 It
might be plausibly argued that this dismissal was unwise and that a
court resolving the retroactivity issue should consider all the relevant
factors, irrespective of whether or not the litigants so insist.
The fourth criterion, the extent of the detriment that retroactivity
would cause Union to suffer as a result of its reliance on the old Gen-
eral Electric rule, was not applied by the court. Had it been applied,
it would have yielded results favorable to Simpson. At least one writer
has suggested that retroactive application of overruling antitrust deci-
sions should generally be avoided, inasmuch as retroactivity could im-
pose extremely great financial liability on a large business concern
whose operations "involving the potential of antitrust illegality" neces-
sarily entail great expenditure of time and capital and bring it into con-
tact with numerous potential plaintiffs. 1 5 Because Union did have con-
signment agreements with more than three thousand service-station oper-
111. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 904 (9th Cir. 1969).
112. Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
113. Id.
114. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 905 (9th Cir. 1969).
115. Note, Retroactive Application of Overruling Decisions in Antitrust Treble
Damage Suits, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 837, 843.
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ators, this point is well-taken. The writer, however, was referring to
unlimited retroactivity. Retroactive application of the Simpson rule to
Simpson alone would not be open to the objection that it would cause
Union to incur extreme financial detriment as a result of its reliance
on General Electric. Especially is this so in view of the indications
that Simpson's damages may not have been very large. 1 " Paradox-
ically, Simpson's inability to recover a large judgment against Union
may actually be a point in his favor, since it eliminates a possible objec-
tion to retroactivity.
Finally, there remains the fifth criterion: Was Union's reliance on
General Electric reasonable and justifiable? The Ninth Circuit devoted
a considerable part of its opinion to a discussion of Union's reliance on
General Electric. It concluded that General Electric had embodied a
clearly defined doctrine under which Union's program of consignment
price-fixing was lawful, and that therefore Union's reliance was reason-
able.1
17
The court's inquiry was not misdirected; as was previously shown,
reliance can be termed reasonable only if the rule relied upon was
clearly defined. However, other authorities have not shared the Ninth
Circuit's view that General Electric, which dealt with consignment mar-
keting of patented products, "clearly" upheld the lawfulness of consign-
ment price-fixing when nonpatented products are involved. For ex-
ample, when an antitrust defendant advanced this contention in support
of its motion for summary judgment, the federal district court in Rhode
Island suggested that the Supreme Court's Simpson decision "was not
nearly the radical departure from established antitrust law which de-
fendant claims it to be.""" The suggestion is supported by Justice
Douglas's majority opinion in Simpson, which purported to distinguish
General Electric rather than overrule it; it was asserted that "whatever
may be said of the General Electric case on its special facts, involving
patents, it is not apposite to the special facts here.""'  Obviously if the
factual situation in the Simpson case was not parallel to that in General
Electric, Union could not convincingly plead its reliance on the latter
decision as a defense to retroactivity of the former. As one commenta-
tor noted, "Mr. Justice Douglas's insistence that G.E. was not apposite
raises doubts as to the justifiability of Union Oil's reliance on that deci-
sion.,"120
On the other hand, as the Ninth Circuit observed, Justice Douglas'
concluding remarks about "the rule governing price-fixing which we
116. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 907-10 (9th Cir. 1969).
117. Id. at 906-07.
118. Stanton v. Texaco, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 884, 889 (D.R.I. 1968).
119. 377 U.S. at 23.
120. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REV. 143, 282 (1964).
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announce today"' 21 seem to imply that the Court knew it was changing
a rule laid down in General Electric.'22 The whole problem is compli-
cated further by the fact that the legality of consignment price-fixing in
situations involving nonpatented goods was a question never consid-
ered by the Supreme Court during the 40 year interval between General
Electric and Simpson.123 Those who contend that this precise question
was settled by General Electric are unable to cite any later Supreme
Court cases in support of their contention. This fact, together with the
widespread confusion and disagreement over both the precise ratio
decidendi of General Electric and the precise effect of the Simpson
holding upon General Electric, cast considerable doubt on any facile
conclusion that the General Electric rule was, prior to the Simpson deci-
sion, a "clearly defined judicial doctrine."
But even assuming arguendo that the General Electric doctrine,
superseded by Simpson, was a "clearly defined" doctrine under which
Union's consignment price-fixing was lawful, that fact alone does not
necessarily make Union's reliance on General Electric reasonable. Re-
liance is reasonable only if the rule relied upon is both clearly defined
and generally approved by the legal community.' 24  Assuming that the
legality of vertical price-fixing by consignment was clearly established
in the General Electric case, several important questions still remain.
Was the practice generally approved? Were there, in the years inter-
vening between General Electric and Simpson, any judicial pronounce-
ments indicating that the Supreme Court would -not continue to sanc-
tion the practice much longer?
As early as 1942, the Supreme Court manifested its opposition to
the use of agency arrangements as a subterfuge by which to evade the
antitrust laws. In the well-known Masonite25 case, decided that year,
the Court declared that section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibited a
scheme whereby the Masonite Corporation marketed its patented hard-
board products through nine erstwhile competitors appointed as del
credere agents. These "agents" sold the products at uniform prices de-
termined by Masonite. By a literal application of the General Electric
rule, this arrangement would have been perfectly legal. The Court, how-
ever, elected not to apply General Electric, reasoning that "[s]o far as the
Sherman Act is concerned, the result must turn not on the skill with
which counsel has manipulated the concepts of 'sale' and 'agency,' but
121. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 25 (1964).
122. "We ... have held that the Supreme Court in Simpson knew it was
announcing a new rule and so stated." Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 907
(9th Cir. 1969).
123. Cf. note 15 supra.
124. See note 65 supra.
125. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
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on the significance of the business practices in terms of restraint of
trade."126  To be sure, the "agency" price-fixing combination con-
demned in Masonite was a horizontal combination between former com-
petitors, not a vertical combination between manufacturer and retailer.
But considering the established antitrust doctrine that all forms of price-
fixing are illegal per se, -12 7 one could argue that it was but a short and
quite predictable step from Masonite to Simpson. One could also
plausibly argue that Masonite diminished the reasonableness of
Union's reliance on General Electric.
Conclusions
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that whenever a court
disallows retroactive operation of a new case-law rule, it does so for one
or more-usually more-of the following reasons: (1) because retro-
activity would not subserve the purposes underlying the new rule, (2)
because retroactivity is not necessary in order to reward the plaintiff
who successfully persuaded the court to adopt a new rule, (3) because
retroactivity would hamper the administration of justice, (4) because
retroactivity would cause a losing defendant who relied on an overruled
precedent to suffer extreme detriment or inconvenience, or (5) because
the losing defendant's reliance on an overruled precedent was reason-
able and justifiable.
By the same token, however, the foregoing analysis has also dem-
onstrated, at least to this writer's satisfaction, that a strong case can be
made that these reasons do not apply to the Simpson case. The very
limited form of retroactivity that Simpson asked the Ninth Circuit to
allow in his case would have promoted the compensatory purpose of the
Simpson rule, it was necessary in order to reward the "pathbreaking"
plaintiff, it would not hamper the administration of justice, nor would
it cause Union to suffer extreme detriment as a result of reliance on
General Electric, a reliance that was marginally justifiable at best.
These conclusions raise considerable doubt concerning the soundness of
the latest Ninth Circuit Simpson decision.
Nevertheless, the decision should not be dismissed as clearly er-
roneous. To do so would be to evince a fundamental misunderstanding
of the retroactivity issue and all its unavoidable complexities. However
ardently the proponents of mechanical jurisprudence and the seekers
of "certainty in the law" may wish it otherwise, there simply exist no
microsensitive balance-scales on which such imponderables as "reason-
ableness" of reliance-to mention only one example-can be weighed
126. Id. at 280.
127. Compare United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940),
with United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911), and United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
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and compared with quasi-mathematical precision. Hence each decision
in this area is to an extraordinary degree the resultant of an individual
court's necessarily intuitive exercise of informed judgment. The Ninth
Circuit recognized this when it acknowledged, with overtones of resig-
nation, that "[t]he problem is fraught with difficulties,"12 8 and that
"what the [Supreme] Court does, when this case again reaches it, will
determine whether the Simpson rule is retrospective or prospective and
whether it should be applied to the Simpson case.
1 29
Thomas R. Fahrner*
128. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 905 (9th Cir. 1969).
129. Id. at 902. In Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 396 U.S. 13 (1969), the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari-limited to the retroactivity issue-and in a brief per
curiam opinion reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. In what was perhaps a be-
lated clarification of the concluding sentence in its 1964 Simpson opinion, the Court
stated that its reference there to equities possibly warranting prospective application
"was not an invitation to deny the fruits of successful litigation to this petitioner."
Id. at 14. The ground of reversal was set forth in a single sentence: "Formulation
of a rule of law in an Article I case or controversy which is prospective as to the
parties involved in the immediate litigation would be most unusual, especially where
the rule announced was not innovative." Id. (emphasis added).
Ascertainment of the reasoning that underlies a cryptic per curiam opinion can
be a rather speculative and hazardous enterprise. It seems safe to assume, however,
that the Court's language does not constitute an endorsement of the generally dis-
credited thesis that the case-or-controversy requirement (U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2)
precludes federal courts from according purely prospective operation to a new case-law
principle. However "unusual" pure prospectivity may be, never has the Supreme Court
held it to be unconstitutional. An eminent authority on federal procedure makes the
following cogent argument in support of his conclusion that the case-or-controversy
requirement furnishes no constitutional impediment to pure prospectivity in the federal
courts: "The overruling decision is rendered in an actual controversy between adverse
parties. The continued soundness of a controlling precedent is certainly a matter
properly before the court when the precedent is under attack. If the court decides to
overrule that precedent, the question whether the newly announced rule should be ap-
plied to the case at bar is then also properly before the court." 1B J. MooRE & T.
CnRER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 0.402 [3.-2 to -3], at 191 (2d ed. 1965).
It seems equally safe to assume, in view of the italicized portion of the quota-
tion in the first paragraph above, that the Supreme Court refuses to regard its 1964
Simpson decision as having established any revolutionary new doctrine. Whether or
not the Simpson rule was "innovative" is surely a debatable point. The Ninth Circuit
considered that it was. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 411 F.2d 897, 907 (9th Cir. 1969).
But assuming that the Supreme Court was correct in thinking otherwise, it follows that
the Ninth Circuit's decision had to be reversed. To say that the Simpson rule was not
innovative is tantamount to saying that even prior to 1964, the 1926 General Electric
decision would not reasonably have been read as legalizing large-scale consignment
price-fixing in a situation involving nonpatented products. That being the case,
Union Oil should not be heard to claim, as a defense to retroactive application of the
Simpson rule, that it reasonably relied on General Electric. The Supreme Court's
latest Simpson decision, therefore, underscores the critical importance, in antitrust
litigation raising the issue of retroactivity, of the fifth criterion discussed herein-
reasonableness of reliance.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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B. Antitrust Jurisdiction of the Maritime Commission-Matson
Navigation Co. v. Federal Maritime Commission,
405 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1968).
Matson Navigation Co. v. Federal Maritime Commission,' a case
of first impression, was brought before the Ninth Circuit on the petition
of Matson to have a Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) order and
decision approving the merger of three shipping lines2 set aside and
suspended. The principal issue to be resolved was whether or not the
FMC has authority under section 15 of the Shipping Act' to approve
written merger agreements submitted to it under the provisions of the
Act and to immunize such agreements from subsequent antitrust prose-
cution.
Section 15 of the Shipping Act provides that a memorandum of
all agreements between carriers by water must be filed with the FMC if
these agreements have certain enumerated effects on rates, regulate,
prevent or destroy competition, or "in any manner [provide] for an
exclusive, preferential, or cooperative working arrangement." The
FMC is empowered to disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement
found to be unjustly discriminatory or unfair. The implementation of
any unfiled agreement of the type mentioned is a violation of the Act,
and the United States can prosecute the offenders and recover fines.
In the case at hand, the three companies submitted to the FMC
an agreement stipulating that they agreed to consolidate "in the form
and by the procedures as the directors and stockholders of the three
companies should approve."4  Matson, an unsubsidized common car-
rier by water competing in the California-Hawaii offshore domestic
trade, recognizing that the company to be formed under the proposed
plan would have the largest fleet of subsidized vessels in the Pacific
under the United States flag,5 intervened in the proceedings and argued
against approval of the merger agreement on three alternative grounds.
First, it maintained that the FMC lacked jurisdiction under section 15
to approve merger agreements. Second, even if jurisdiction were as-
sumed, the merger lacked finality and therefore could not be approved.
Finally, Matson claimed that the merits of the merger did not warrant
approval.6 Nevertheless, the FMC approved the agreement.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the FMC's ruling that section
1. 405 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1968).
2. The three companies were American Mail Line, Ltd., American President
Lines, Ltd., and Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.
3. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1964).
4. 405 F.2d at 800.
5. Brief for Matson as Petitioner at 3.
6. Id. at 5-6.
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15 empowers the FMC to approve mergers between shippers and
thereby immunize such agreements from antitrust prosecution, but re-
manded for further proceedings because the proposal presented to the
FMC was not a proper merger agreement.7
Lack of Statutory Authority for Merger Jurisdiction
Matson is the first case in which the FMC has asserted jurisdiction
under section 15 of the Shipping Act to approve merger agreements
between domestic carriers. The FMC attempted to support its decision
by referring to its earlier decision in Isbrandtsen Steamship Co.," where
a section 15 agreement for the sale of steamship assets, which also con-
tained a covenant not to compete, was approved.9 That case, however,
is inapposite to the question of merger jurisdiction. Although the
FMC had asserted in Isbrandtsen that the agreement was subject to sec-
tion 15, it is unclear whether it based its jurisdiction on the covenant not
to compete, which is clearly within section 15,10 or the proposed merger
agreement. Likewise, the report to the Celler Committee," which the
FMC relied on as proof that Isbrandtsen gave notice of the FMC's
power over merger agreements, indicates that merger jurisdiction extends
only to the type of agreement approved in that particular case-agree-
ments containing covenants not to compete.'" There was no FMC prece-
dent upon which to base the type of merger jurisdiction claimed in
Matson.
7. 405 F.2d at 800.
8. Isbrandtsen S.S. Co., 7 F.M.C. 125 (1962).
9. Brief for Matson as Petitioner at 25.
10. Section 15 specifically mentions agreements that regulate or prevent compe-
tition.
11. Hearings on the Progress Report from the Federal Maritime Commission
Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962).
12. Id. at 22. The important testimony given by former FMC Chairman Stakem
was:
'"r. Appel: ... Are shipping lines to be on notice that if they desire to
merge, they must submit the proposal under Section 15 of the Act?
"Mr. Stakem: I think. . . if the plan calls for a non-compete or has noncompete
clauses in it, that it falls within the sphere that this Commission should look at."
A later statement by Chairman Stakem (which was relied on by the FMC as
giving merger jurisdiction) is as follows: "I believe that Section 15 and our decision
in the Isbrandtsen-Export Merger case constitute notice that merger agreements be-
tween common carriers subject to the Shipping Act, 1916, which control, regulate,
prevent, or destroy competition or in any way provide for exclusive, preferential, or
cooperative working arrangements, must be filed with the Commission. . . ." Id. at 23
(emphasis added). The italicized phrase has the effect of limiting or modifying the
type of mergers over which the Commission has jurisdiction. The conclusion indicated
is that the merger must contain a covenant not to compete or some other type of
working arrangement.
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The text of section 15 offers little assistance in determining
whether any merger jurisdiction is conferred by the Shipping Act. It
states:
Every common carrier by water, or other person subject to this
chapter, shall file immediately with the Commission a true copy,
or ... a true and complete memorandum, of every agreement
with another such carrier or person ... [1] fixing or regulating
transportation rates or fares; [2] giving or receiving special rates,
accommodations, or other special privileges or advantages; [3]
controlling, regulating, preventing, or destroying competition; [4]
pooling or apportioning earnings, losses or traffic; [5] alloting
ports or restricting . .. sailings ... [6] limiting or regulating
...the volume or character of freight or passenger traffic ...
[7] or in any manner providing for an exclusive, preferential or
cooperative working arrangement.
The section does not mention merger, and unless it can be successfully
argued that a merger falls within the category of an "exclusive, prefer-
ential or cooperative working arrangement,""3 the actions of the FMC
appear to be without statutory sanction. Construing the statute as a
whole, item 7 is simply an extension of the working arrangements enu-
merated in 1 through 6.1' It seems inconsistent for the framers of the
Act to have conscientiously listed the type of agreements to be subject
to FMC jurisdiction in six instances, and then to have used a general
phrase to include such an important area of shipping policy as mergers.' 5
It seems somewhat naive to argue that the word "merger" was
omitted because of a congressional oversight. Prior to the Shipping
Act, Congress had passed the Sherman16 and Clayton Acts, 7 and was
well aware of the scope and operation of statutes regulating business
activity. Furthermore, Congress has not been shy about using the term.
Mergers have been specifically mentioned in statutes giving authority to
the ICC,' 8 CAB 9 and FCC.20  In view of the fact that Congress did
not specifically mention merger jurisdiction in the Shipping Act, the
13. Brief for Matson as Petitioner at 13 and Brief for United States as Re-
spondent at 17 argued that such an interpretation was erroneous. Although the
United States was a party defendant in the proceeding, it filed a brief taking issue
with the FMC's finding as to merger jurisdiction.
14. Brief for Matson as Petitioner at 13.
15. Despite the Matson decision, it is difficult to see a merger as a "working
arrangement." Section 15 of the Act obligates the FMC to maintain supervision
over agreements approved under the Act; this would not be possible in the case of a
merger, since all FMC control would effectively end once the merger was completed.
405 F.2d at 799.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1964).
17. 15 U.S.C. H§ 12-27 (1964).
18. Interstate Commerce Act § 5(2), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1964).
19. Federal Aviation Act § 408, 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1964).
20. Federal Communications Act § 221, 47 U.S.C. § 221 (1964) (the word
used here is consolidation).
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more logical conclusion is that Congress did not intend to include mer-
ger agreements within the scope of the Act.
Recognizing the possible effects on national economic policy that
might result from immunizing agreements from antitrust prosecution,
the Supreme Court has held that statutes exempting commercial activ-
ities from the effects of the antitrust laws will be strictly construed.21
"Repeals of the antitrust laws . . from a regulatory statute are
strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repug-
nancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions."22
The legislative history of the Act also indicates that Congress did
not intend to include mergers among the agreements to be approved by
the FMC. The Alexander Report,2 3 which contains the findings of an
extensive investigation into the practices of steamship conferences, sup-
plied the impetus and information used by Congress in enacting the
Shipping Act.24 The Report includes the results of a questionnaire sent
to United States vessels in foreign trade inquiring about agreements
they had entered into with other carriers and a discussion of several
types of agreements prevalent in the industry at the time.2 5  It is sig-
nificant that merger agreements were not among those discussed; 20 all
agreements mentioned concerned cooperative working arrangements.
The Report endorsed a policy of not outlawing these cooperative ar-
rangements. The basis of the Alexander Committee's recommenda-
tion was its belief that permitting the shippers to continue operating
under the conference agreements would forestall rate wars and other
competitive activities which would result in "a monopoly fully as ef-
fective . . .[as] can exist by virtue of an agreement. '2 7  The Alexan-
der Committee argued, in effect, that the desired result, the preserva-
tion of competition, could most nearly be achieved by continuation of
the conference agreement, subject to the supervision of a regulatory
agency. Mergers seem to be singularly out of place in the Alexander
Committee scheme; in fact, such consolidations are undoubtedly a type
of monopolistic activity that the Committee sought to prevent.
The Effect of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
The foregoing analysis casts serious doubt on the rationale of the
21. See Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966);
United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); California v. FPC,
369 U.S. 482 (1962); Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362
U.S. 458 (1960); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
22. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
23. H.R. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
24. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 275 (1968).
25. H.R. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-280 (1914).
26. Brief for Matson as Petitioner at 15 and Brief for United States as Re-
spondent at 19-20 agree on the absence of discussion of mergers in the Report.
27. H.R. Doc. No. 805, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 416 (1914).
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court's decision in Matson. The Ninth Circuit's decision, however,
may find some support in the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, judi-
cially manufactured and first espoused in the well-noted case of Texas
& Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.2" This doctrine maintains
that when an issue may be brought before either a court or a regulatory
agency, it must go first to the agency, with resort to judicial review
by way of appeal. 29  The doctrine rests on two basic premises: First,
that reference to the agency in all possible cases will provide more
uniform decisions; and second, that the quality of decisions made by
the experts in the administrative agencies will be superior.' 0
Giving merger jurisdiction to the Federal Maritime Commission,
however, will do little to achieve uniform decisions within the shipping
industry. As noted previously, 3' the FMC understands its jurisdiction
to extend only to mergers by agreement. Clearly, the wording of sec-
tion 15 prevents it from extending further.3 2  Therefore, a merger
which can be accomplished unilaterally without an agreement, such as
by stock acquisition, will be beyond the scope of FMC proceedings.
It is interesting to note, therefore, that the parties proposing to merge in
the Matson case may be able to avoid an unfavorable FMC determina-
tion. Since the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceed-
ings before the FMC because the parties had not submitted a final
agreement on which the FMC could act," the parties have the option
of trying to achieve their merger without FMC approval by accomplish-
ing their aim without an agreement. This possibility is illustrated by
the fact that Natomas Co., a company which is not subject to the juris-
diction of the FMC, controls American President Lines (APL) and
Pacific Far East Lines, while APL owns 93 percent of the stock in
28. 204 U.S. 426 (1907); accord, United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S.
59 (1956); Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); United States
Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
29. See generally Fremlin, Primary Jurisdiction and the Federal Maritime Com-
mission, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1967); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HAxv. L. REv.
1037 (1964); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered-The Anti-Trust Laws, 102
U. PA. L. REv. 577 (1954); Schwartz, Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and the
Exhaustion of Litigants, 41 GEo. L.J. 495 (1953); von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws
and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARv. L. Rtv.
929 (1954).
30. United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956); see Comment,
Accommodations of Antitrust Law and Ocean Shipping Regulation, 4 TEx. INT'L L.F.
393, 401 (1968).
31. See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
32. Section 15 covers only enumerated agreements, and modifications or can-
cellations thereof, between persons subject to the Act. See text accompanying note 12
supra. If Matson is given full effect, mergers by agreement between two shippers will
be handled by the FMC, whereas mergers between a shipper and a nonshipping com-
pany will be under the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
33. 405 F.2d at 800-01.
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American Mail Lines. These interests were acquired without any reg-
ulatory supervision from the FMC.3 4 Thus, if it appears that the FMC
will not approve the merger, the merging companies may try to accom-
plish the merger by means not subject to FMC approval. Therefore,
under the regulatory scheme set forth in Matson, one of the basic justi-
fications for submitting mergers to the FMC, uniformity of decision,
is an illusion.
Another argument for referring merger decisions to the FMC is
that they will be better decided by the expert Commissioners than by
the courts. While regulatory agencies are not infallible, their expertise
has long been recognized:
The determination of whether an agreement. . is for the benefit
of the industry or is an unreasonable and oppressive burden which
cannot be justified requires a special fact finding tribunal having
an intimate acquaintance with the needs and practices of the
business and constant experience in resolving the merits of conflict-
ing interests in a vast and complicated industry ...
.. .[]he remedies afforded under the act .. ought to
be exhausted before recourse may be had to the courts. .... 5
Nevertheless, judges are not without expertise in issues which are
usually brought before a regulatory agency.3 6 For example, in at least
two cases involving disputes with labor unions, a court has passed over
the National Labor Relations Board to make its own determinations.
3r
In one case the court noted that it felt it had the ability to reach a proper
decision since it had determined similar issues involving the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.3 8  While it would be dogmatic to insist that antitrust
enforcement must be judicial,3" surely the courts have had sufficient ex-
perience with antitrust violations to qualify them to adjudicate mergers
between shippers.
A further justification for invoking primary jurisdiction, that the
agency can administer a pervasive regulatory scheme,40 disappears un-
der the conditions of the present problem. The Shipping Act, as the
basic regulatory pattern for shipping in United States foreign com-
34. Brief for Matson as Petitioner at 37-38.
35. United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 50 F.2d 83, 88-90
(1931).
36. See Schwartz, Legal Restrictions of Competition in the Regulated Industries:
An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 IAv. L. Rav. 436, 473-74 (1954); Com-
ment, Primary Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 27 U. Cm. L. Rav. 192, 198 (1957).
37. Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Longshore-
men's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952).
38. Meat Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 686 (1965).
39. See Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HAv. L. Rav. 1037, 1070 (1964).
40. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959).
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merce, 41 can only be implemented by the FMC if its power extends to for-
eign as well as domestic shipping.42 Subpoenas may be served on foreign
parties doing business within the United States, 3 and it has been held
that this subpoena power extends to documents outside the United
States.4 4 The FMC, however, would have little control over mergers be-
tween foreign-owned companies. Likewise, as mentioned before it has
no control over mergers by acquisition or with a party not subject to the
Act. 45  In brief, the holding in Matson does not give the FMC the type
of overall control it has in other recognized fields of administration. 46
Thus, there is little to be gained by invoking jurisdiction of the
FMC over mergers. Moreover, some indications of the harmful as-
pects of agency intervention cannot be ignored.
Referring mergers to the FMC may interfere with litigants' rights
to collect treble damages under the antitrust laws.47 The Shipping Act
does not preserve general remedies;48 a party forced to proceed before
the FMC must settle for damages authorized by the Act, 9 or suffer the
considerable delay caused by presenting the FMC's findings before the
court as prima facie evidence.50 In Carnation Co. v. Pacific West-
bound Conference,51 petitioners filed a treble damage suit, alleging that
the Pacific Westbound and Far East Conferences were using a rate-
fixing agreement which had not been approved by the Federal Mari-
time Commission, and that treble damages were recoverable because
implementation of such agreement was unlawful per se under the anti-
trust laws. The Supreme Court reversed an order dismissing the action
and remanded to the district court to stay the proceedings pending a
decision by the FMC on whether the present activities were covered by
41. See generally May, The Status of Federal Maritime Commission Shipping
Regulation under Principles of International Law, 54 GEO. L.J. 794, 799 (1966).
42. Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147, 154 (D.C. Cir.
1959); Kerr S.S. Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1960).
43. See May, The Status of Federal Maritime Commission Shipping Regulations
under Principles of International Law, 54 GEo. L.J. 794, 816 (1966).
44. FMC v. DeSmeldt, 366 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 974
(1966).
45. See text accompanying note 31-34 & note 32 supra.
46. There is nothing to prevent shippers from designing mergers to incur or
evade FMC jurisdiction, whichever appears more beneficial. As a rule, they have
more to gain by filing a section 15 agreement because they thereby gain immunity
from antitrust prosecution in the federal courts and from treble damage suits.
47. P. HADLICK, TREBLE DAMAGES UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS 4 (1940).
48. See S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n of America, 191 F.2d 658, 663 (D.C.
Cir. 1951).
49. Cf. Keough v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922) (discussing the
Interstate Commerce Act).
50. Schwartz, Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and the Exhaustion of Liti-
gants, 41 GEO. L.J. 495, 500 (1953).
51. 383 U.S. 213, 224 (1966).
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a 1952 agreement which had received FMC approval. Treble damages
were recoverable in this case only because the petitioner was allowed
to remain in district court while awaiting the FMC's decision.
Although Matson might at first glance appear to be in conflict
with Carnation, the two cases can be reconciled. The decision in Car-
nation is based on a strict construction of the provisions of the Shipping
Act. Antitrust immunity is available only for agreements filed before
the FMC; Carnation held that until an agreement was actually filed
before the FMC, there would be no jurisdiction conferred on that body
under the Shipping Act.52 Obviously, since the FMC does not obtain
jurisdiction until the agreement is filed, the Justice Department must
be free to proceed against any unfiled agreements. If the Justice De-
partment could not act in that situation, mergers could take place unim-
peded by any government regulation or control. Nevertheless, Carna-
tion, although not directly contrary to the Ninth Circuit decision in
Matson, seems to have found a better approach to the problem of mari-
time merger agreements.
There had been a tendency in the older cases to dismiss a case
commenced in court once it was claimed that the FMC had to be con-
sulted because a section 15 agreement was involved.53 The approach
adopted in the recent Carnation decision was to leave the case in court,
apply the antitrust laws to it, and refer to the FMC only those segments
of the proceedings that are peculiarly within its field of expertise.
5 4
There is no apparent reason why an injunction issued to prevent the
continuation of illegal conduct would interfere with the FMC's activi-
ties. 5 Nor does it appear essential always to stay the proceedings
while the FMC decides a question outside the court's domain but neces-
sary to the final determination of an issue in the case. The FMC may
make its decision while the court is in the process of hearing the rest
of the case.5 6 Although the final ruling cannot be made before the
FMC has acted, the judicial process in many instances will be accel-
erated by permitting the court, acting concurrently with the FMC, to
decide issues whose outcomes are not dependent on the FMC's findings
but are necessary to the ultimate determination of the case.
52. Id. at 218-20.
53. See Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); United States
Navigation Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
54. See Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 216-17,
219, 222 (1966).
55. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 327 U.S. 439 (1945); United States Naviga-
tion Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 50 F.2d 83, 89 (1931); see Comment, Accommodation
of Antitrust Law and Ocean Shipping Regulation, 4 TEx. INT'L L.F. 393, 407 (1968).




The decision in the Matson case cannot be discussed without giv-
ing some thought to its pervasive effect on the national economic policy.
While the practice of referring mergers to the FMC does not neces-
sarily imply a supersession of antitrust principles,5 7 the FMC quite
probably will not vigorously enforce those principles."5 This was made
clear in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,59 where the Court held
that the Interstate Commerce Commission, in determining cases before
it, was to "consider the effect of the merger on competitors and on the
general competitive situation in the industry in the light of the objec-
tives of the national transportation policy."60 But all the ICC had to
do was consider; it was not required, as suggested in the dissent, to
agree to subordinate competitive interests only when no other viable
alternative exists. 61 These considerations apply equally to the Federal
Maritime Commission, which is allowed to use its discretion in deciding
how much emphasis to place on maintaining competition.
62
The antitrust acts are generally considered to have been designed
to promote competition.6 3  The Federal Maritime Commission, how-
ever, has shown a tendency to treat competition as one of many vari-
ables, exchanging it freely to obtain desired results rather than making
an effort to preserve it intact.64  One writer maintains that the FMC,
more than other regulatory agencies, has been indifferent to the main-
tenance of competition in its field. 65 Plaintiffs, acting under the belief
that the FMC has a strong industry orientation and that defendants
ought to be subject to the exacting provisions of the antitrust laws, gen-
erally seek to bring their cases before the courts rather than the FMC. 66
Since the language of the Shipping Act does not compel the inclu-
sion of mergers within section 15,67 and the arguments usually es-
57. Hale & Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to
Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 46, 50 (1963); Note, The Isbrandtsen
Decision: Anti-trust Laws, Regulated Industries and the Doctrine of Primary
Jurisdiction, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 803, 805-6 (1959).
58. Hale & Hale, supra note 57, at 50.
59. 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
60. Id. at 87.
61. Id. at 94 (Douglas, J.). Contra, FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc.,
346 U.S. 86 (1953).
62. See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87-88 (1944).
63. Hale & Hale, Competition or Control I: The Chaos in the Cases, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 641, 682 (1958).
64. See Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Indus-
tries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436, 449 (1954).
65. Id. at 466.
66. See von Mehren, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doc-
trine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARv. L. REv. 929, 941 (1954).
67. See text accompanying notes 13-22 supra.
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poused in favor of primary jurisdiction are far from persuasive in the
present case,68 it seems unwise to bypass the federal courts in order
to give merger jurisdiction to the FMC. The FMC members are
not selected on the basis of their knowledge of antitrust law, nor can they
be expected to acquire much skill in that field. On the other hand,
federal judges, by reason of their tenure on the bench, may be ex-
pected to gain considerable experience in antitrust matters, even if
they lack exposure in that area when they are first appointed. The
best solution would be to permit wronged parties to receive the full
protection of the judicial process under the antitrust laws while receiv-
ing the benefits of the agency process by referring to the FMC those
issues that, because of its experience, it is uniquely qualified to deter-
mine.
Pamela Sallander*
C. Advertising Allowances to Retailers-Clairol Inc. v. FTC,
410 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1969).
In Clairol Inc. v. FTC,1 the Ninth Circuit broadened the scope of
section 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act,2 which imposes controls
against price discrimination. Section 2(d) prohibits payments to any
buyer in consideration for the buyer's promotion of the manufacturer's
products unless the manufacturer provides similar advertising allow-
ances to all of its buyers. The Ninth Circuit affirmed with modifica-
tions an order of the Federal Trade Commission directing Clairol to
cease and desist from granting advertising discounts to certain beauty
salons "competing in the distribution" of Clairol products, unless Clairol
provided discounts on "proportionally equal terms" to its other cus-
tomers. In holding the allowances afforded to these beauty salons dis-
criminatory, the Ninth Circuit made two important findings: first, that
68. See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
* Member, Second Year Class.
1. 410 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1969).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 13(d) (1964). Section 2(d) provides in full: "It shall be
unlawful for any person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of
anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course of
such commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities fur-
nished by or through such customer in connection with the processing, handling, sale,
or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered
for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on pro-
portionally equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such
products or commodities."
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for purposes of the Robinson-Patman Act, a beauty salon was a retailer
of Clairol products; second, that all retailers, regardless of the number
of intermediate wholesalers between the retailer and the manufacturer,
are "customers" of the manufacturer for the purposes of Section 2(d).
The beauty salons in question purchased beauty products directly
from Clairol and used them in serving salon customers. Advertisements
were displayed by the salons to encourage customers to request that
Clairol products be used in the course of beauty treatments. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission held that even though a salon customer paid a
unitary price for both the product and the service of a beautician, the
transaction constituted a resale of Clairol's product, thus bringing the
advertising allowances granted to the direct-buying beauty salons within
the Robinson-Patman Act. Since Clairol provided advertising allow-
ances only to direct-buying beauty salons and not to wholesalers, the
FTC directed Clairol to grant similar advertising programs and allow-
ances to its wholesalers.
The Robinson-Patman Act, an amendment to the Clayton Act,
was intended to strengthen the prohibitions against supplier price-dis-
count practices which inured to the benefit of the large, volume-buying
chain store and to the detriment of the small retail businessman.' Sec-
tion 2(d) of that Act deals with the form of discount whereby suppliers,
instead of granting cash kickbacks, grant advertising allowances, which
large retailers use to lower consumer prices of products below levels
that could be matched by retailers who are unable to obtain the al-
lowances.
4
Price Discrimination by Clairol
In argument before the Ninth Circuit, Clairol admitted that it pro-
vided advertising allowances to beauty salons but maintained that sec-
tion 2(d) did not apply to those allowances, on the grounds that the
beauty salons in question were not "competing [with retailers] in the
distribution" of Clairol products because they did not resell Clairol
products but exhausted them while serving their customers. Therefore,
it claimed, the products were used only as equipment in the performance
of a service.5
The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the complete con-
sumption of the product at the salon prevented a finding that the trans-
action constituted a resale. It noted that Clairol's products were not
supplied in bulk but in individual packets "as would be secured in a
3. A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 217-18 (1966).
4. Id. at 251.
5. 410 F.2d at 648.
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drugstore sale"; moreover, the advertising encouraged customers to ask
for Clairol products. Accordingly, said the court, the customer, not
the salon, was the final purchaser.'
The Robinson-Patman Act does not define the term "resale, ' 7 nor
is a definition attempted in the FTC Guides for Advertising Allowances
and Other Merchandising Payments and Services," which offers defini-
tions for other terms left undefined in the Act. While the distinction
between a contract for sale and a contract for services in another
branch of the law is not necessarily applicable to the Robinson-Patman
Act,9 the definition of "resale" in cases arising outside the Act is in
sharp contrast to the Ninth Circuit's definition under section 2(d).
In accord with the definition advanced by Clairol, these cases hold
that in contracts for the rendering of a professional skill, the considera-
tion paid is for a service, and any material furnished in the process is
incidental to the service.' 0 The courts, to determine the subject matter
of transactions between contracting parties, have attempted to ascer-
tain whether the fundamental purpose of the customer is to receive a
service or to obtain a product.'1 This test, applied in other legislative
contexts, has placed beauty salons in the category of service establish-
ments.'
2
Although the few cases in point arising under the Act have neither
offered a definition of "resale" nor, before Clairol, considered the cate-
gorization of beauty salons, they do, nevertheless, reflect the same ap-
proach taken by cases arising outside the Act. A recent Fifth Circuit
case advanced the general test that "the dominant nature of the trans-
action must control" in determining whether there was a service ren-
6. Id.
7. Definitions for certain terms of the Act are given in 15 U.S.C. §§ 12, 13
(1964).
8. The discussion of the guides in this Note is directed toward recent amend-
ments of the guides. The guides as they appeared before amendment are in 16
C.F.R. § 240 (1969). The first proposed amendments appear in 33 Fed. Reg. 10616
(1968). The second draft of the amendments can be found in 34 Fed. Reg. 4926
(1969). The third and final draft is in 34 Fed. Reg. 8285 (1969). A definition of
resale appears in none of these four documents.
9. The Seventh Circuit, in reviewing a price discrimination issue in Corn
Products Ref. Co. v. FTC, 144 F.2d 211, 219 (7th Cir. 1944), warned against
the use of such analogies in developing definitions for terms used in the Robinson-
Patman Act.
10. See, Comment, Contracts for Services Distinguished from Those to Sell
Goods, 15 FoRDHAm L. Rv. 92, 106-07 (1946).
11. Id.
12. E.g., Fleming v. A.B. Kirschbaum Co., 124 F.2d 567, 572-73 (3d Cir. 1941);
Stucker v. Roselle, 37 F. Supp. 864, 867 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
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dered or a sale of goods."3 Other Robinson-Patman cases have de-
clared that the use of bricks in construction did not constitute a resale
of the bricks, 4 that the purchase of a shave in a barber shop is not a
purchase of shaving cream, 15 and that the purchase of a shoe shine does
not involve a sale of shoe polish.16 Particularly if an analogy is drawn
between beauty salons and barber shops, these prior cases provide a
definition of "resale" that conflicts with the Clairol holding.
The term "resale" must, of course, be examined within the con-
text of the entire Act. The Act deals with "sellers who sell products
for resale, with or without processing." In presenting its argument
to the Ninth Circuit, the FTC in Clairol relied heavily on the Supreme
Court case of Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC,'8 which interpreted
the phrase "with or without processing" as a comprehensive term en-
larging the scope of the term "resale."' 9  In Corn Products, the Court
held that even though the defendant processed dextrose into candy and
then sold the candy, this still constituted a resale of dextrose. 20  None-
theless, the Supreme Court's broad definition of resale does not justify
the Clairol decision; beauty salons do not process or change cosmetics
but merely use them in the performance of a service.
Before condemning the Ninth Circuit for failing to follow analo-
gous cases, however, it is necessary to determine whether there are fac-
tors which distinguish Clairol from the general rule. The court clearly
thought there were:
Here the service rendered by the salon is not a generalized
service provided alike to all comers and the product is not con-
sumed by the salon in performing or equipping itself to perform
such a service. The service rather is individualized and the prod-
uct is used directly on the customer herself. The products are
not used in bulk but in individual packages such as would be
secured in a drugstore sale. The product used is chosen to
meet the individual needs or desires of the salon's customer and
the choice is the customer's. It is the customer, and not the salon,
13. Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 369 F.2d 268, 270
(5th Cir. 1966).
14. General Shale Prods. Corp. v. Struck Constr. Co., 37 F. Supp. 598, 602
(W.D. Ky. 1941).
15. Mueller v. United States, 262 F.2d 443, 447-48 (5th Cir. 1958).
16. Id. at 448.
17. Although the phrase "with or without processing" appears only in section
2(e) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(e) (1964), the courts read sections 2(d) and 2(e)
together. State Wholesale Grocers v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 154 F. Supp. 471,
474 (N.D. Ill. 1957). The FTC guides interpret the term to cover both sections. 16
C.F.R. § 240.2 (1969), as amended, 34 Fed. Reg. 4926, § 240.2 (1969).
18. 324 U.S. 726 (1945).
19. Id. at 744.
20. Id.
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who is the ultimate consumer. The fact that the product is also
wholly consumed on salon premises does not alter this fact.
21
The attempted distinction is unconvincing because of the difficulty
in ascertaining any difference between the activities of the beauty salons
in the instant case and what the court considered normal beauty salon
procedure. In determining whether the predominant nature of the
transaction is the sale of goods or a service, it makes little difference
that the customers of the beauty salons were not all given identical
treatment, or that customers could choose, if they wished, the brand of
cosmetics to be used by the beauticians. The customers were still inter-
ested primarily in receiving professional service.
The Ninth Circuit attempted to bolster its holding by reference to
the policy basis of the Act:
It was precisely this sort of discrimination that § 2(d) was intended
to reach. "The Robinson-Patman Act was enacted in 1936 to
curb and prohibit all devices by which large buyers gained dis-
criminatory preferences over small ones by virtue of their greater
purchasing power."1
22
This underlying policy, however, in all probability would not have been
thwarted by a contrary decision in Clairol. It is highly doubtful that
beauty salons are within that class of "large buyers" meant to be curbed
by the Act. Even more tenuous, it seems, is the finding of a poten-
tially destructive competitive relationship between beauty salons, drug
stores, and other retail distributors of Clairol products. It is difficult to
believe that the framers of the Act foresaw a threat to small retailers
from equally small service establishments that charge considerably more
for a service utilizing a particular product than is charged for the sale
of that product alone.
The Protected Competitor
The other important aspect of Clairol was the Ninth Circuit's de-
termination of the class of competitors protected by the Act. In coming
to its determination, the Ninth Circuit relied on and interpreted the
recent case of FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc.
23
In Fred Meyer, the FTC had issued an order holding supplier ad-
vertising discounts for selected retailers to be discriminatory when sim-
ilar allowances were not afforded to wholesalers purchasing from the
supplier.24 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that section 2(d) pro-
vided protection only for those customers of the supplier competing
21. 410 F.2d at 648.
22. Id., quoting FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960).
23. 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
24. Id.
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against the favored purchaser on the same level of distribution. The
FTC order was accordingly modified to require the supplier to grant
similar allowances to its other retailers, not to its wholesalers.25
The Court, in a complete reversal of existing law,26 then ruled
that retailers were protected whether they purchased directly from the
supplier or indirectly through the supplier's wholesalers.27 Prior to
Fred Meyer, the supplier was not required to provide advertising allow-
ances to indirect-purchasing retailers unless the supplier was attempting
to avoid his obligation of equal treatment by using an intermediate
wholesaler merely as a guise.2 s
This new interpretation of the Act was based on the Court's inter-
pretation of Congress' intent "to curb and prohibit all devices by which
large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by
virtue of their greater purchasing power. ' 2  The Court felt economic
realities were such that the goal of Congress would be thwarted unless
indirect-purchasing retailers were afforded the protection of the Act in
all circumstances. 0
The FTC order in Clairol had originally required that Clairol in
granting advertising allowances cease discriminating against its whole-
salers in favor of the direct-purchasing beauty salons. In the interim,
however, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Fred Meyer.
When Clairol appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit, the FTC con-
ceded that its order should be modified to conform to the holding in
Fred Meyer. It asked the court to modify the order so that Clairol
would be required to give all its retailers the same advertising allow-
ances it gave the direct-buying beauty salons.31 Clairol contended that
Fred Meyer, on its facts,32 required equal treatment by the supplier only
of those customers buying from direct-purchasing wholesalers.33 The
Ninth Circuit, however, adopted the FTC's counter-argument that the
Fred Meyer decision, despite its limited fact situation, called for no
25. Id. at 356.
26. The FTC guides prior to Fred Meyer defined "customer" as one who buys
directly from the seller. 16 C.F.R. § 240.3 (1968).
27. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 348-50 (1968).
28. This practice was thwarted by the "doctrine of indirect purchaser" which
required direct dealing between the supplier and the retailer controlled by the
supplier. Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), has said the Fred Meyer decision has eliminated the direct dealing and control
requirements of the doctrine. Id. at 887.
29. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349 (1968).
30. Id.
31. 410 F.2d at 649.
32. In Fred Meyer, the supplier and retailer were separated by only one whole-
saler. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1968).
33. 410 F.2d at 649.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21
ANTITRUST LAW
such limitation but indicated rather that the Supreme Court felt that
the framers of the Robinson-Patman Act wanted to protect all competi-
tors at the same distribution level, regardless of the number of interven-
ing distributors.
3 4
This position seems to be supported by the language of the Su-
preme Court in Fred Meyer:
We conclude that the most reasonable construction of § 2(d) is
one which places on the supplier the responsibility for making
promotional allowances available to those retailers who compete
directly with the favored buyer.35
Nowhere did the Court indicate that this construction would apply only
in cases of retailers buying from direct-purchasing wholesalers.36 In
fact, in a more recent case, the Court seemed to approve, at least indi-
rectly, a broad construction of its decision in Fred Meyer when it inter-
preted "customer" in section 2(a) of the Act, a companion price dis-
crimination section, to include retailers separated from the supplier by
two levels of distributors. Drawing an analogy to section 2(d), the
Court said:
In Meyer, the Court stated that to read "customer" narrowly
would be wholly untenable when viewed in light of the purposes
of the Robinson-Patman Act. Similarly, to read "customer" more
narrowly in this section than we did in the section involved in Meyer
would allow price discriminations to avoid the sanctions of the Act
by the simple expedient of adding an additional link to the distri-
bution chain.3
7
The Ninth Circuit's extension of section 2(d)'s protection to re-
tailers purchasing from indirect- as well as direct-purchasing whole-
salers is undeniably in harmony with the spirit, if not the facts, of Fred
Meyer. The decision, however, by making immaterial the number of
intervening wholesalers, increases the difficulties for the supplier in ac-
quitting his responsibilities under section 2(d). The court's meager
discussion of the nature and extent of this responsibility is ambiguous
and contradictory.
In Fred Meyer, the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms placed
responsibility upon the supplier to insure that all retail customers are
afforded similar promotional plans and that they receive similar pay-
ments. 8 Except for several offhand suggestions, however, it left open
the issue of how this responsibility was to be implemented. Justice
Harlan in his dissent in Fred Meyer had pointed out that since the sup-
34. Id.
35. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 347 (1968).
36. See id. at 347.
37. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 647 (1969).
38. FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 358 (1968).
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plier is often unaware of the identity of indirect-purchasing retailers, it
would be difficult for him to formulate similar promotional plans
for unknown recipients and inform unknown retailers of the avail-
ability of advertising allowances.39 The majority of the Court suggested
that the supplier's problem could be solved by the use of wholesalers to
communicate the plan.40 This solution has been criticized as lacking
protection against uncooperative or unreliable wholesalers. 4 Another
suggestion that the supplier attach notices to shipments of its products
also has drawbacks in that most promotional campaigns are short-
termed; under these circumstances some retailers would probably not
be notified in time to take advantage of the campaign. 42 Since retailers
can sue the supplier for treble damages for failing to meet section 2(d)
obligations,43 these difficulties are of very real significance to suppliers.
Although Clairol urged the same arguments of "impracticality"
before the Ninth Circuit, 44 the court summarily dismissed them by
stating:
The fact that Clairol's problems may be more complex than
those of Meyer's suppliers does not call for a different result.
The purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was to strike down all dis-
criminatory promotional schemes of this sort. If the form of a
promotional arrangement is such that discrimination is unavoidable
that fact does not render the arrangement immune; rather it ren-
ders it unacceptable.
45
This language suggests an absolute responsibility for notice by the sup-
plier to all retailers regardless of the number of intervening levels of
wholesalers. A preceding footnote to the opinion, however, calls into
question the absoluteness of this responsibility. The court quotes from
a portion of the FTC Amended Guides for Advertising Allowances
which defines the term "competing customer," and includes the follow-
ing example:
Example 1. A manufacturer sells to some retailers directly and
to others through wholesalers. Retailer "X" purchases the manu-
facturer's products from a wholesaler and resells some of it to re-
tailer "Y". Retailer "X" is a customer of the manufacturer.
Retailer "Y" is not a customer unless the fact that he purchased
the manufacturer's product is known to the manufacturer.40
39. Id. at 359-62 (dissenting opinion).
40. Id. at 358.
41. Note, Trade Regulations-Robinson-Patman Act Section 2(d)-Promotional
Allowances, 47 N.C.L. Rav. 243, 251 (1968).
42. Id. at 251-52 & n.47.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
44. 410 F.2d at 649.
45. Id. at 650.
46. Id. at 649-50 n.3, quoting 34 Fed. Reg. 4926, § 240.3(b), example 1 (1969);
see text accompanying note 38 supra.
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According to the court, the FTC "[bly placing the burden on retailer
'Y' to inform the manufacturer, [removes] the onerous aspect of this
requirement ... ."I" Thus the guidelines may, in certain cases, ren-
der unavoidable discrimination immune rather than unacceptable, a sit-
uation quite contrary to the express language in the body of the Clairol
opinion.
48
The confusing state of the law arising from the inconsistencies of
the Clairol decision would appear to make future litigation almost im-
perative. Its definition of "resale" to encompass the service-oriented
beauty treatment appears to be out of step with other cases arising both
within and outside the Act. There appears to be no compelling policy
reason or factual distinction to support such a decision. On the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit's declaration that all retailers on the same dis-
tribution level are to be protected by the Act regardless of the number
of intermediate distributors develops a proper interpretation of the Fred
Meyer holding. Nevertheless, it seems incongruous, if not totally in-
consistent, for the court, in one portion of its opinion, to take the em-
phatic position that on the basis of Fred Meyer any program which
47. 410 F.2d at 649-50 n.3.
48. The guidelines footnoted by the court represent the second of three drafts
for amending the FTC Guides. In the first draft, the Commission took essentially
the same view of the absoluteness of the supplier's responsibility to notify the retailer
as did the Ninth Circuit in the text of its opinion in Clairol. In this draft, the FTC
followed to the letter the mandate of the Fred Meyer decision, stating that the "seller
must take effective action to inform all his competing customers of the availability
of the advertising allowance plan." 33 Fed. Reg. 10616, § 240.8 (1968) (emphasis
added). And the responsibility of giving such notice "rest[ed] squarely upon [the]
sellers." Id. § 240.11. Compare Clairol Inc. v. FTC, 410 F.2d 647, 649-50 (9th
Cir. 1969).
Eight months after the publication of the first draft, the FTC issued a second
draft, which evidenced a noticeable change of policy by the Commission. It changed
the supplier's responsibility from an absolute one to one conditioned by a rule stating
that the "seller must take reasonable action, in good faith, to inform all his com-
peting customers of the availability of his promotional program." 34 Fed. Reg.
4926, § 240.8(2) (1969) (emphasis added). The use of the terms "reasonable" and
"in good faith" constitute more than a slight change. When this language is read in
conjunction with the qualification on the definition of "competing customer" in section
240.3(b), example 1 (quoted by the court in Clairol, 410 F.2d at 649-50 n.3), it is
clear that the FTC has retreated from its position of absolute responsibility adopted in
the first draft of the regulation.
The Commission's policy shift undoubtedly occurred as a result of pressure
exerted by large manufacturers and from efforts by the Commission to provide a
workable solution to the problems inevitably to be visited upon business by the Fred
Meyer decision, and particularly by the Commission's extension of that decision in its
regulations. See 34 Fed. Reg. 4926, § 240.3 (1969), upheld in Clairol Inc. v. FTC,
410 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1969). The FTC has maintained its position in the third draft,
which was very similar to the second. 34 Fed. Reg. 8285, §§ 240.1-.17 (1969).
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does not inure to the equal benefit of all customers, no matter how far
removed from the manufacturer, is unacceptable, and then to drop a
footnote endorsing the new FTC guides which take a less rigorous posi-
tion. This inconsistency places businessmen in the unenviable position
of having to guess which of the conflicting statements in Clairol the
Ninth Circuit will follow in future decisions. They can only hope their
choice avoids an adverse judgment in a treble damage action.
James T. Winkler*
* Member, Second Year Class.
